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Information security is an important and urgent priority in the
computer systems of corporations, governments, and private users.
Malevolent software, such as computer viruses and worms, constantly
threatens the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of digital
information. Virus detection software announces the presence of a
virus in a program by issuing a virus alert. A virus alert presents two
conflicting legal issues. A virus alert, as a statement on an issue of
great public concern, merits protection under the First Amendment.
The reputational interest of a plaintiff disparaged by a virus alert, on
the other hand, merits protection under the law of defamation. The
United States Supreme Court has struck a balance by
constitutionalizing the common law of defamation in a series of
influential decisions. This article focuses on two implications of these
decisions, namely that (1) a plaintiff must show that the defamatory
statement is objectively verifiable as true or false; and (2) a plaintiff
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must prove its falsity with convincing clarity, while the defendant may
prove the truthfulness of the statement as a defense. The crucial issues
in these implications are truth, falsity, and verifiability.
This article analyzes the balance between the conflicting legal
rights associated with a virus alert. It focuses on the legal meanings of
truth, falsity, and verifiability of a virus alert, and the resolution of
these issues in the context of the technology involved in a virus alert.
The analysis merges perspectives from constitutional law, the law of
defamation, and information technology. Insights from theoretical
computer science demonstrate, for instance, that the truth of a virus
alert may be unverifiable. In such a case the alert would receive full
constitutional protection under the Supreme Court's First Amendment
defamation jurisprudence.
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Computer security is an important and urgent priority in the
information networks of corporations, governments, and, increasingly,
private users, especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The interconnectivity and interdependence of
computers on the Internet have made users increasingly vulnerable to
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cyber attacks emanating from a variety of wrongdoers, such as cyber
criminals, terrorist groups, and, perhaps, even rogue nation states.1
The most powerful weapon available to cyber attackers is a
type of computer code generically known as "malevolent software."
Malevolent software is designed to disrupt the operation of computer
systems.2  The most common of these rogue programs are the
computer virus, and its common variant, the so-called "worm."
3
Viruses can be programmed to access and steal confidential
information; to corrupt and delete electronic data; and to monopolize
computational resources that should be available to legitimate users.
The escalation of virus attacks on the Internet has prompted
the development of advanced virus detection and elimination
technologies. Virus detection software issues an alert when it detects
virus-like behavior or properties in a program. The leading anti-virus
technologies are sophisticated and effective, but virus detection errors,
known as false positives and false negatives, nevertheless do occur. A
false positive is an indication that a virus has been found when, in
fact, there is none. A false negative is the converse, namely the failure
to detect a virus when one is actually present.
A virus alert tends to harm the reputation of a corporation
whose software product has been tagged as viral. The maligned
corporation may initiate a defamation action against the
1. See, e.g., Overview of the Cyber Problem - A Nation Dependent and Dealing
with Risk: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and
Development Before the H. Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 22 (2003)
(statement of Richard D. Pethia, Director, CERT® Centers, Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University) ("As critical infrastructure operators strive to
improve their efficiency and lower costs, they are connecting formerly isolated systems to
the Internet to facilitate remote maintenance functions and improve coordination across
distributed systems. Operations of the critical infrastructures are becoming increasingly
dependent on the Internet and are vulnerable to Internet based attacks."); see also
DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 17 (1999) ("Through
increased automation and connectivity, the critical infrastructures of a country become
increasingly interdependent. Computers and telecommunications systems, for example,
support energy distribution, emergency services, transportation, and financial services.").
2. ROBERT SLADE, DICTIONARY OF INFORMATION SECURITY 118 (2006).
3. A computer virus can be described as a program that (i) infects a host program
by attaching itself to the host, (ii) executes when the host is executed, and (iii) spreads by
cloning itself and attaching the clones to other host programs. Viruses often also have a so-
called "payload," capable of harmful side-effects, such as deleting, stealing, or modifying
information. See FREDERICK B. COHEN, A SHORT COURSE ON COMPUTER VIRUSES 1-2 (2d
ed. 1994); DOROTHY E. DENNING & PETER J. DENNING, INTERNET BESIEGED: COUNTERING
CYBERSPACE SCOFFLAWS 73-75 (1998). A "worm" is similar to a virus in most respects,
except that it does not need to attach itself to a host program to replicate and spread. Like
viruses, worms may carry destructive payloads. See generally John F. Schoch & Jon A.
Hupp, The 'Worm" Programs-Early Experience with a Distributed Computation, 25
COMM. ACM 172, 172 (1982).
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manufacturer of the virus detection software. For example, in
December 1992, a news story in the Wall Street Journal reported that
a federal judge had ordered McAfee Associates, Inc., a producer of
computer security software, to stop distribution of one of its products
that falsely identified a virus in the software of a company, Imageline,
Inc.4  Imageline sued McAfee, alleging defamation, among other
claims.5  The complaint alleged that the false positives scared
customers away, hurting the company's reputation.6 McAfee declined
comment, other than stating that the suit was without merit.
7
This article analyzes the balance between two conflicting legal
rights associated with a virus alert. A virus alert, as a statement on
an issue of great public concern, merits protection under the First
Amendment. The reputational interest of a plaintiff disparaged by a
virus alert, on the other hand, merits protection under the law of
defamation. The United States Supreme Court has struck a balance
by constitutionalizing the common law of defamation in a series of
decisions, starting in 1964 with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.8 This
article focuses on two implications of these decisions, namely that (1) a
plaintiff must show that the defamatory statement is objectively
verifiable as true or false; and (2) a plaintiff must prove the
statement's falsity with convincing clarity, while the defendant may
prove the truthfulness of the statement as a defense. The crucial
issues in these implications are truth, falsity, and verifiability.
The analysis merges three perspectives, namely the Supreme
Court's First Amendment defamation jurisprudence, the common law
of defamation, and the technological environment in which a virus
alert occurs. Analysis of the defamatory implication of a virus alert
shows that a virus alert is substantially true if, and only if, the object
identified as viral is capable of reproducing by executing an infection
module. Conversely, a virus alert is false if the object either does not
have an infection module or if the infection module cannot execute,
perhaps due to a programming or logical error. This result provides a
rigorous and logical definition of the truthfulness of a virus alert as a
4. Junda Woo, False Alarms Over a Virus, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at B6.
5. John Burgess, Viruses: An Overblown Epidemic?; Suit Against a Calif. Firm
Highlights Computer Industry Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1992, at F1; Kephart et al.,
Blueprint for a Computer Immune System, IBM THOMAS J. WATSON RESEARCH CENTER 1,
11 (1997), available at http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/Kephart/VB97/
index.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see Woo, supra note 4, at B6.
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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defamatory statement. It also provides the forensic basis for proof of
truthfulness.
This article further demonstrates the resolution of the issues of
truth, falsity, and verifiability based on forensic analysis of (1) the
technology that issued a virus alert and (2) the digital properties of
the viral object. The analysis highlights a striking entanglement of
law and technology. Insights from theoretical computer science show,
for instance, that the truth of a virus alert, as defined in this article,
may be indeterminate under certain conditions. When these
conditions apply, the alert would receive full protection under the
Supreme Court's First Amendment defamation jurisprudence.
This article is organized as follows: Part I discusses the
elements of a defamation action; Part II reviews the evolution of the
Supreme Court's First Amendment defamation jurisprudence; Part III
discusses the principles of malevolent software; Part IV analyzes the
anatomy of a virus alert; and Part V analyzes the truth, falsity, and
verifiability of a virus alert.
I. PRINCIPLES OF DEFAMATION
The tort of defamation protects the interest of a person or
corporation in their reputation and good name.9  A defamatory
statement is a false statement of fact about a person or business entity
that tends to harm their reputation, respect, or goodwill. 10 Courts
have upheld claims for defamation when a party has untruthfully
stated that a person is a credit risk,11 that a kosher meat dealer has
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Defamation is the broader
term for libel and slander. Libel is concerned with written or printed words, or more
generally, embodiment of the defamatory message in tangible or permanent form. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 785 (5th ed. 1984).
Slander constitutes oral defamation. Id.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558-559 ("A communication is defamatory
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."); Jessica R.
Friedman, Defamation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 794 (1995). The Code of the Australian state
of Queensland defines "defamation" as:
Any imputation concerning any person, or any member of the person's family,
whether living or dead, by which the reputation of that person is likely to be
injured, or by which that person is likely to be injured in the person's profession
or trade, or by which other persons are likely to be induced to shun or avoid or
ridicule or despise the person ....
Queensl. Stat., c. 35, § 366 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Neaton v. Lewis Apparel Stores, Inc., 48 N.Y.S.2d 492, 497 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1944) (reversing the lower court's dismissal of a claim for libel based on a letter
written by defendant to plaintiffs employer stating that plaintiff was a bad credit risk).
2008]
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sold bacon, 12 and that a physician has advertised. 13 Defamation law
aims to protect the reputational interests of a plaintiff by allowing her
to restore her good name, and to obtain compensation and redress for
harm caused by defamatory statements. 4 Courts have extended the
protection of defamation law to the reputational interests of
corporations.' 5 Although a corporation has no reputation in the
personal sense of an individual, 16 it has a reputation and standing in
the business community in which it operates.' 7 A corporation can sue
for defamatory statements related to matters affecting its business
reputation and practices, such as financial soundness, management,
and efficiency.1
8
The complexity of the tort of defamation is illustrated by the
elements that have to be satisfied to establish a cause of action. One
author has identified nine elements, 19 while another lists twenty-
three,20 each crucial to a defamation action. The defamation plaintiff
must plead and prove the following elements:
21
1. The statement of fact must be published to a third party other than the plaintiff.
2. The statement must be false.
12. See Braun v. Armour & Co., 173 N.E. 845, 845 (N.Y. 1930).
13. See Gershwin v. Ethical Publ'g Co., 1 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937).
14. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) ("Defamation law
developed not only as a means of allowing an individual to vindicate his good name, but
also for the purpose of obtaining redress for harm caused by such statements." (citation
omitted)).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 cmt. b (1977); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 9, § 111, at 779; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827
F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987).
16. See Golden Palace, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974);
Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Reporters' Ass'n of Am. v. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n, 79 N.E. 710, 711 (N.Y. 1906).
17. See Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
18. See Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377, 382-83
(5th Cir. 1967); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 82 F.2d 115,
119 (8th Cir. 1936); Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1930); Di
Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561
(1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 128, at 962-63 (discussing the law of injurious
falsehoods' concern with false statements that harm economic interests, but do not harm
the corporate reputation); Milo Geyelin, Corporate Mudslinging Gets Expensive-Aggrieved
Do More Than Turn Other Cheek, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1989, at B1.
19. See Robert D. Nelon, Media Defamation in Oklahoma: A Modest Proposal and
New Perspectives-Part I, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 478, 487-88 (1981).
20. W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221,
1233-35 (1976).
21. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:34 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
2007); Friedman, supra note 10, at 794.
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3. The statement must be defamatory or, in other words, harmful to the reputation
of the plaintiff.
4. The statement must have reasonably referred to the plaintiff.
5. The defendant must have acted with the requisite degree of fault. The fault
requirement depends on the plaintiffs status. A private-figure plaintiff must prove
negligence, namely that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant lacked
reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true, or failed to take
reasonable care to ascertain the truth. A public plaintiff22 must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant published the statement with "actual
malice." Actual malice is defined as "with knowledge that the statement was false,
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."23
6. The statement must be objectively capable of being proven materially false.
7. The statement must have caused actual harm to the plaintiff. There are three
categories of defamation damages: special, presumed, and punitive damages.
Special damages compensate the plaintiff for pecuniary or economic loss flowing
directly from the reputational harm caused by the defamatory statement.24 This
type of harm must be proven with reasonable certainty.25 In cases where damages
are difficult to quantify, a plaintiff may be allowed to recover presumed damages, if
certain conditions are met.26 The plaintiff may recover punitive damages in cases
where the defendant published a statement with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.27
8. The statement must not be privileged, as a privileged publication is not
actionable. Judges, attorneys, jurors, and legislators, for instance, can plead an
absolute privilege for statements made in furtherance of their official duties.2
8
A person or corporation can be defamed by more than written
or spoken words. 29 Defamation may occur by means of a picture, a
22. "Public plaintiff' includes a public official, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); a public figure, see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967);
and a limited purpose public figure, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974). Limited purpose public figures are people who "have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The "public official" category is fairly wide, and includes,
for instance, government employees. See 1 SLADE R. METCALF & LEONARD M. NIEHOFF,
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS, AND REPORTERS 1.50, at
177 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
23. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
24. 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § 10.3.2 (3d ed. 2007).
25. See Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1000 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
26. Presumed damages may be allowed, even if special damages cannot be proven,
provided the defamation falls into a "per se" category. A statement that the plaintiff had
committed a crime, for instance, would be defamation per se. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 570 (1977).
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 115, at 845.
28. Id. § 115, at 824-32.
29. The Restatement supports a broad interpretation of what may constitute
defamatory speech. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 565 cmt. b, at 170 ("To be
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gesture, a loaded question, or an insinuation. And, the defamatory
imputation may be indirect. For example, signing the plaintiffs name
to false 30 or bad authorship"l has been held to be defamatory.
Plaintiffs who were defamed by comments published on the Internet
have filed successful defamation actions. For instance, in Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., a defamatory statement was
posted on a bulletin board maintained by Prodigy, an Internet service
provider (ISP).32 The statement claimed that the plaintiffs had
committed fraud in connection with an initial public stock offering.
33
The plaintiffs filed a defamation action, and prevailed in the Supreme
Court of New York. 34  Congress subsequently passed legislation
exempting ISPs from liability for online defamation. 35  Shortly
thereafter, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia denied recovery to a plaintiff in a
defamation action against an ISP under the safe harbor provision for
ISPs. 36 The court observed that, although an ISP is immune from
liability, the original author of the defamatory statements could
potentially be held liable.
37
defamatory under the rule stated in this Section, it is not necessary that the accusation or
other statement be by words. It is enough that the communication is reasonably capable of
being understood as charging something defamatory."); see also Defamation Act, 1996, c.
31, § 17(1) (Eng.) (stating that a defamatory statement means "words, pictures, visual
images, gestures or any other method signifying meaning").
30. See, e.g., Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ'g Co., 167 N.E. 432, 434 (N.Y. 1929) ("To
publish in the name of a well-known author any literary work, the authorship of which
would tend to injure an author holding his position in the world of letters, has been held to
be a libel."); Locke v. Benton & Bowles, Inc., 1 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937) (holding
that falsely attributing authorship of a script states a valid claim for defamation), rev'd on
other grounds, 2 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151-152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (dismissing for failure to set
forth appropriate facts in the complaint).
31. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill, 356 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1966) (vacating
judgment for plaintiff on libel and invasion of privacy claims and remanding to determine
compensatory damages for libel based on false attribution of authorship of an article);
Carroll v. Paramount Pictures, 3 F.R.D. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (denying defendant-movie
studio's motion for summary judgment in action for libel claiming that defendant falsely
attributed production of a movie to plaintiff-producer).
32. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 805178,
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)).
36. 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327 (4th Cir. 1997) (immunizing ISPs to defamation liability for third-party content).
37. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51 ("None of this means, of course, that the
original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would escape accountability."
(quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331)).
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The defamatory comments in Internet defamation cases were
published as computer-generated words and images, which were
downloaded and displayed on user terminals. A virus alert is
communicated to a recipient in a similar format, namely a computer-
generated message alerting a computer user to the presence of a virus.
The analogy suggests that courts will likely recognize that a plaintiff
can be defamed by a virus alert.
The defendant in a defamation action involving a virus alert
may argue that computer-generated communication, such as a virus
alert, merits protection under the First Amendment. This position
has received support among academic commentators, 38 and courts
have in fact recognized protection for specific categories of computer-
generated output, such as digital simulation of sexual activity by
minors that does not rise to the level of obscenity.3 9
Professor Dan Burk has argued in favor of First Amendment
protection for computer-generated output, pointing to the analogy
between computer output and First Amendment protected music. 40
The scope of First Amendment protection of music extends to the
musical output of a piano roll or compact disc. The output generated
by computers, as the digital analogue of the output of a piano roll,
whether in the form of text, graphics, or sound, should, therefore,
receive equivalent protection. 41 Professor Burk explains the analogy
by noting that piano rolls have sequences and patterns of punched
38. Academic commentators have argued that computer output is an expression of
functions and operations performed by a computer, analogous to spoken and written
expressions of the human mind, and thus, within the scope of First Amendment protection.
See Roy N. Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270, 280
(1976-77); see also Gary T. Walker, The Expanding Applicability of Strict Liability
Principles: How is a "Product" Defined?, 22 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 12-15 (1986).
39. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (finding a federal statute
that banned computer-generated child pornography to be unconstitutional); Norman T.
Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of
"Definitional Balancing" as a Methodology for Determining the "Visible Boundaries of the
First Amendment," 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 524 (2006) ("'[T]he distribution of descriptions or
other depictions of sexual conduct [by minors], not otherwise obscene, which do not involve
live performance or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First
Amendment protection.' This includes ... computer generated images .... " (quoting New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)));
Norman Andrew Crain, Commentary, Bernstein, Karn and Junger: Constitutional
Challenges to Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 887 (1999) ("[E]xpression
does not lose First Amendment protection just because it interacts with a machine or ... a
computer."). However, obscene works, including computer-generated images involving
obscenity, are not First Amendment protected. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240.
40. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form
of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.").
41. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 115 (2000).
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holes that "constitute a type of machine-readable 'program"' and
"express music by tripping the mechanism of a player piano."42
However, courts have been reluctant to extend constitutional
protection to computer-generated output that does not advance the
ideals of the First Amendment. In Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Vartuli,43 the Second Circuit contemplated whether the
First Amendment protected computer-generated trading commands.
The computer system at issue required no independent intellectual
effort from the user.44 The user, for the system to work as marketed,
was supposed to obey the computer's buy and sell signals literally and
without question.45 The court stated that the purpose of the computer
output was not to communicate information, but to prompt action
without engaging the mind or will of the recipient.46 None of the
ideals pursuant to which speech is normally accorded constitutional
protection-such as the pursuit of truth, the prevention of abuse of
authority, and the functioning of a democracy-were relevant to this
communication. 47  The court concluded that the defendant who
distributed this automatic trading system did not engage in
constitutionally protected speech.
48
In conclusion, a virus alert, as a statement on a significant
public issue, merits First Amendment protection, but is also subject to
the law of defamation.
II. EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT DEFAMATION JURISPRUDENCE
Until 1964, defamation was outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. Defamation law strongly favored the plaintiff,
and courts treated defamation virtually as a strict liability tort.49 A
42. Id.
43. 228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000).




48. Id. The court issued a caveat:
Statements in the form of orders or instructions are strikingly common .... We
do not think and do not mean to suggest by our holding today that such
communications "can claim talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations." ... Any assertion that a statement like or unlike the "buy" or "sell"
instructions issued by a . . . computer is not fully protected by the Constitution
should be subjected to careful and particularized analysis to insure that no
speech entitled to First Amendment protection fails to receive it.
Id. at 112 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1963)).
49. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38
VAND. L. REV. 247, 249 (1985); Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintifrs Burden
in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826 (1984).
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plaintiff merely had to allege falsity to establish a cause of action for
defamation, while defendants had to prove the truth.50 Liability and
damages were presumed, and a plaintiff could recover without
showing any actual harm.51  Defendants had several potential
defenses, including truth, absolute privilege, conditional privilege, and
fair comment.52 In practice, however, these defenses were difficult to
establish, and pleading them sometimes exposed defendants to further
liability.
53
The constitutionalization of the common law of defamation,
which started in 1964, dramatically reshaped plaintiffs' positions,
especially with respect to the burdens of proof of truth and falsity,
fault, and the opinion privilege.
A. Truth, Falsity, and the Burden of Proof
In a landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
54
the Supreme Court redefined the contours of libel litigation and
eroded much of plaintiffs' previously favored positions. In New York
Times, a public official of Alabama filed a defamation suit against the
New York Times based on an advertisement in the newspaper that
alleged police misconduct towards members of the civil rights
movement. 55 The trial court found for the plaintiff and awarded
damages of $500,000.56 The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the
judgment. 57
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in
defamation actions brought by public officials, the Constitution
requires a plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
50. See Bloom, supra note 49, at 249; Franklin & Bussel, supra note 49, at 826.
51. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hayes, 171 P. 293, 294 (Cal. 1918).
52. See Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the
Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 763 (1990) ("A defendant could
invoke a fair comment privilege by proving that (1) the statement concerned a matter of
legitimate public interest, (2) the facts upon which the statement was based were either
stated or known to the reader, (3) the statement was the actual opinion of the defendant,
and (4) the statement was not motivated solely by the purpose of causing harm to the
plaintiff.").
53. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 49, at 826 n.6 ("In addition to the difficulty with
regard to proof, an assertion in the pleadings that the statement was true may expose the
defendant to further liability. If he should fail to prevail on that issue, the court may
consider the pleading to be a republication of the libel." (citation omitted)).
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. Id. at 256.
56. Id.
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (Ala. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
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statement at issue was published with "actual malice,"58 a standard
that the plaintiff had not met.59 The Court defined actual malice as a
statement made with either knowledge of its falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.60 The Court further held that a plaintiff must
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, which is a
stricter standard than the civil preponderance of the evidence, but less
rigorous than the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
61
The rationale underlying New York Times was that the First
Amendment should function 'to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people."' 62  The Court concluded that imposing the burden of
proving the truth of the statement on the critic of official conduct
amounted to a form of self-censorship, contrary to the ideals of the
First Amendment.
63
Although the New York Times Court did not specifically state
that truth is an absolute defense in a defamation action against a
public official, it is implied by the actual malice requirement. 64 The
logic of this conclusion is well articulated in Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, Inc., where the Court of Appeals of New York reasoned
that placing the burden of proof of falsity on the plaintiff "follows
naturally from the actual malice standard. Before knowing falsity or
reckless disregard for truth can be established, the plaintiff must
establish that the statement was, in fact, false."65 The New York
Times decision has also been interpreted by the Supreme Court,66
58. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
59. Id. at 283.
60. Id. at 280. In a subsequent opinion, the Court described "reckless disregard" for
the truth as entertaining serious doubts about the truth of the statement before making it.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
61. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
62. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
63. See id. at 279.
64. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:4.
65. 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306 (N.Y. 1977).
66. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) ("The plaintiffs burden is now
considerably expanded. In every or almost every case, the plaintiff must focus on the
editorial process and prove a false publication attended by some degree of culpability on
the part of the publisher."); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975) ("[T]he
defamed public official or public figure must prove not only that the publication is false but
that it was knowingly so or was circulated with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.");
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("We held in New York Times that a public
official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false
• . . or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true."). The New York Times Court
itself clearly stated that true speech can never be the basis of liability. New York Times,
376 U.S. at 271 ("Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have
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lower courts,67 and academic commentators 68 as imposing on a public
figure plaintiff the burden of proof of falsity. Public figures are people
who are in the public eye, but not public officials.
69
In the same year that New York Times was decided, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute
that allowed truth as a defense only for statements made "with good
motives and for justifiable ends."70  This limitation on the truth
defense appears to have been held unconstitutional when the Court
declared that "[t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal
sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned." 71  Three
years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 72 the Court extended the
actual malice standard of New York Times to public figure defamation
plaintiffs. The Court also held that a public figure plaintiff must
prove malice by clear and convincing evidence.
73
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the plaintiff, Elmer Gertz, filed a
defamation suit against a magazine that had made several untrue
statements about him, including a charge that he was an official in a
Communist organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the
U.S. government.74 Gertz prevailed at trial and won a jury award. 75
The trial court overturned the jury verdict, however, holding that the
New York Times fault standard of actual malice applied to defamation
actions involving matters of public concern, a standard that Gertz had
not met.76 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that, although
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth . . . and especially one
that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker." (citation omitted)).
67. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that
"when the suit is brought by a public official or by a public figure . . .the burden of
establishing that the published material was false is on the plaintiff"); Beckham v. Sun
News, 344 S.E.2d 603, 604 (S.C. 1986) ('"hen a libel action is brought by a public official
or public figure, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press require the
plaintiff to establish the defamatory falsehood was made with actual malice, i.e., with
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (citation
omitted)).
68. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 49, at 851-54; Kathryn Dix Sowle,
Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair
Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 488 (1979); Linda Kalm, Note, The Burden of Proving Truth
or Falsity in Defamation: Setting a Standard for Cases Involving Nonmedia Defendants, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 812, 813 (1987).
69. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
70. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 70.
71. Id. at 74.
72. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
73. See id. at 164.
74. 418 U.S. 323, 326 (1974).
75. Id. at 329.
76. Id.
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the matter under litigation was one of public concern, Gertz was
nevertheless a private figure because he had not deliberately brought
himself into the public eye. 77 The Court found that a private figure's
reputational interest merited greater protection than that provided by
the actual malice requirement. 78 The Court concluded that states may
impose any standard of care (other than strict liability) in defamation
actions involving private plaintiffs. 79 Therefore, a private individual
must prove that the defendant acted at least negligently.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Supreme Court indicated that
truth would be a complete constitutional defense, in both private and
public figure cases.8 0  This position was consistent with the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,81 as well as a number of lower court
holdings.8 2 In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Supreme
Court confirmed the status of truth as a constitutional defense in
private figure cases, at least where speech on matters of public
interest is concerned and a media defendant is involved. 83
B. Evolution of the Opinion Privilege
The general consensus is that expression of opinion, as distinct
from statement of fact, must be protected from liability under
defamation law.8 4 Professor Robert Post commented that "opinions
are in their nature debatable. To impose sanctions for 'false' opinions
is to use the force of law to end this potential debate by imposing
legally definitive interpretations of the cultural standards at issue."8 5
Although support for an opinion privilege is evidently strong, the legal
77. See id. at 345.
78. Id. at 343-46.
79. Id. at 347.
80. 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) ("One who publishes a
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is
true.").
82. See, e.g., Corabi v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 273 A.2d 899, 908 (Pa. 1971) ("[T]he
opposite of falsity, truth, is a complete and absolute defense to a civil action for libel."
(citations omitted)); see also 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:5-5:8 (discussing truth as a
constitutional defense in private figure cases).
83. 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986).
84. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984)
("The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an
aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.").
85. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV.
603, 664 (1990).
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distinction between actionable fact and protected opinion has proved
to be difficult and elusive.
8 6
Historically, treatment of opinion in the law of defamation has
gone through three stages: (1) common law "fair comment"-largely
prior to 1974; (2) protection based on the Supreme Court's dictum in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 7 -between 1974 and 1990; and (3)
treatment based on the Court's opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.-1990 to present.
88
The privilege of "fair comment" was born of the Court's
sensitivity to the dangers inherent in legal limitations on freedom of
expression. The privilege was designed to insure robust and open
debate on public issues.8 9 The defendant could rely on a fair comment
privilege, provided the statement was (1) on a matter of public
interest; (2) true or privileged; (3) the actual opinion of the speaker;
and (4) made in good faith.90  The privilege turned out to be
inadequate and impractical, and its scope was uncertain. 91  For
instance, a prediction as to whether a given statement merited
protection would depend on factors that vary among jurisdictions.
The doctrine of fair comment was eventually superseded when
the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., hinted that the
traditional common law distinction between fact and opinion may also
trigger First Amendment concerns. 92 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, elaborated on the fact-opinion distinction:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience
of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
86. See Ott, supra note 52, at 761 n.1 (providing a bibliography on the pre-1990
literature on the fact-opinion distinction).
87. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
88. 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see 1 SACK, supra note 24, § 4.2.1.
89. See Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1227-36 (1976), cited in 1 SACK, supra note 24, § 4.2.2 n.18.
90. See, e.g., Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.W. 167, 173-74 (Iowa 1923) ('The utmost
extent to which these cases go is that, where a person, knowing or honestly believing that a
candidate for public office is guilty of conduct affecting his fitness for the position to which
he aspires, communicates that knowledge or belief to the electors whose support the
candidate seeks, acting in good faith in the discharge of his duty to the public, the
communication is privileged-a doctrine the correctness of which we need not now
consider."' (quoting Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100 N.W. 867, 873 (Iowa
1904))).
91. See W. Andrew Scott, Note, Fair Comment in California: An Unwelcome Guest,
57 S. CAL L. REV. 173, 195 (1983).
92. 418 U.S. 323.
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careless error materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate on public issues.
93
Although technically dictum, Justice Powell's statement rapidly
assumed constitutional status in the judiciary. Subsequent Supreme
Court opinions have mentioned the Gertz dictum with approval, 94 and
most state and federal courts have taken it to establish an absolute
constitutional privilege for statements of opinion. 95 A subsequent
version of the Restatement (Second) of Torts stated that "[t]he common
law rule that an expression of opinion of the . . . pure[] type may be
the basis of an action for defamation now appears to have been
rendered unconstitutional by U.S. Supreme Court decisions. '96
The Gertz dictum did not provide any analytical means of
distinguishing between an actionable assertion of fact and protected
opinion, and post-Gertz courts struggled with the distinction. In one
influential decision, Olman v. Evans, the District of Columbia Circuit
formulated a widely used test.97 Writing for the court, then-Judge
Kenneth Starr articulated four factors that distinguished fact from
opinion, namely (1) the ordinary meaning of the language used; (2) the
verifiability of the statement; (3) its linguistic content; and (4) the
social context.
98
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court
revisited the opinion privilege. 99 The plaintiff in Milkovich was a high
school wrestling coach whose team had become involved in an
altercation during a wrestling match. 100  The Ohio High School
Athletic Association (OHSAA) conducted a hearing into the incident,
in which Milkovich, as well as H. Don Scott, the Superintendent of
93. Id. at 339-40 (citation omitted).
94. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984).
95. See Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1286
(4th Cir. 1987) ("The constitutional distinction between fact and opinion is now firmly
established in the case law of the circuits."); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("Gertz's implicit command thus imposes upon both state and federal courts the duty
as a matter of constitutional adjudication to distinguish facts from opinions in order to
provide opinions with the requisite, absolute First Amendment protection."); 1 SACK, supra
note 24, § 4.2.3.1 ("By 1990 every federal circuit and the courts of at least thirty-six states
and the District of Columbia had held that opinion is constitutionally protected because,
according to Gertz, '[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."'
(alteration in original)).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977). The Restatement
defined "pure opinions" as those that "do not imply facts capable of being proved true or
false." Id. § 566 cmt. b.
97. 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
98. Id. at 979-85.
99. 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
100. Id. at 3-4.
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Maple Heights Public Schools, testified. 10 1 Following the hearing, the
OHSAA censured Milkovich, placed his team on probation, and
declared the team ineligible for the 1975 state tournament. 102 The
parents of several members of the wrestling team promptly sued the
OHSAA, claiming that they were denied due process in the OHSAA
proceedings. 03 After a second hearing, in which Milkovich and Scott
both again testified, the court overturned the OHSAA's orders. 104
The next day, J. Theodore Diadiun, a sports columnist, wrote
an article criticizing Milkovich's role in the altercation, as well as his
testimony in the court proceeding. 10 5 The heading for his column
stated, "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie."' 0 6 The column included
a passage stating that the message for Maple Heights students was
"[i]f you get in a jam, lie your way out." 0 7 The column continued,
asserting that "[a]nyone who attended the meet . . . [knew] in his
heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having
given his solemn oath to tell the truth."'08 The tenor and language of
the article clearly implied that Milkovich and Scott had perjured
themselves, an indictable offense in the State of Ohio. 10 9
Milkovich and Scott both sued the journalist, as well as his
newspaper, for defamation, claiming that the published article
accused them of perjury."0 The Supreme Court of Ohio, applying
Ollman's four-factor analysis, held that Diadiun's column was
constitutionally protected opinion."' The Court of Appeals of Ohio, in
a separate action by Milkovich, concluded that it was bound by
precedent and upheld a grant of summary judgment against
Milkovich."1 2  The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Milkovich's
appeal for failing to raise a substantial constitutional issue, and
Milkovich petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court.
1 3







108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 21.
110. Id. at 6-7.
111. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986).
112. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that, "as a matter of law, . . . the article in question was constitutionally protected
opinion").
113. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10 (1990).
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1. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
constitutional issues raised by the Ohio courts. 114 The specific issues
before the Court were (1) whether only statements of fact are
actionable and (2) whether the distinction between opinion and fact
should be determined under the Olman four-factor test.1 5
After summarizing the constitutional evolution of defamation
law, the Court referred to its famous dictum in Gertz,116 which had
been interpreted by numerous courts as providing First Amendment
protection to any statement that could be labeled "opinion."117 The
Court rejected this view,118 stating that such an interpretation would
"ignore the fact that expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an
assertion of objective fact."119 Therefore, the opinion privilege should
not immunize speakers from liability by prepending the magic words
"in my opinion" to a statement. 20 The Court illustrated with the
comment, "In my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar," which, although
stated as opinion, could nevertheless be just as damaging to Jones'
reputation as the assertion "Jones is a liar."1 21 Such a statement is
actionable because it implies unstated defamatory facts underlying
the author's statement.122
The Court concluded that "the 'breathing space"' which
'freedoms of expression require in order to survive,"' is adequately
secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an
artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact."1 23 One such existing
114. Id.
115. See id. at 9.
116. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues." (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted)).
117. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18 ("[T]his passage 'has become the opening salvo in
all arguments for protection from defamation actions on the ground of opinion, even though
the case did not remotely concern the question."' (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co.,
639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980))).
118. Id. ("[W]e do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a
wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion."').
119. Id.
120. See id. at 20.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 19 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964))).
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constitutional doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff prove the
falsity of a defamatory statement on a matter of public concern, as
articulated in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.124 The Court
reasoned that Hepps stands for the principle that "a statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a
provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional
protection."1
25
A second protective constitutional doctrine identified by the
Court was that of a line of Supreme Court cases that protects "loose,
figurative, or hyperbolic" statements that cannot reasonably be
understood as implying an assertion of objective fact about the
plaintiff. 26 The special status of these types of expression derives
from the constitutional protection provided for parody and other
imaginative commentary by decisions such as Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell127 and Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bresler,128 rather than from any separate constitutional protection for
opinion."
29
The Milkovich Court rejected the dichotomy between fact and
opinion, holding that the appropriate constitutional inquiry is not
whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion, but whether it is
capable of being proven true or false based on objective evidence.
130
The Court concluded that "a statement of opinion relating to matters
of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual
connotation will receive full constitutional protection."' 3' To
illustrate, the Court compared the statement, "In my opinion Mayor
Jones is a liar," with the statement, "In my opinion Mayor Jones
shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and
Lenin."' 32 The former implies a verifiable fact and, thus, would be
124. 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986).
125. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
126. See id. at 20-21; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (stating
that a parody of Rev. Falwell was not actionable because it "was not reasonably
believable").
127. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
128. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
129. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20-21. The third rule identified by the Court was the
fault requirements of New York Times, Butts, and Gertz. Id. at 20. The fourth rule was the
appellate review standard established in New York Times, and reaffirmed in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), which requires an appellate court to
make an independent review of the finding of actual malice, when that standard is
required. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
130. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
131. Id. (internal citation omitted).
132. Id.
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actionable. The latter statement would receive full constitutional
protection.
Thus, the Milkovich Court established verifiability as the sole
criterion that determines the constitutional protection of a statement
on a matter of public concern. Furthermore, a statement is verifiable
in the constitutional sense only if its truth or falsity is based upon
objectively determined facts.
Having set the analytical stage, the Court turned to the facts of
the case before it with a two-step analysis. First, the Court
ascertained the defamatory implication of the article about Milkovich
and Scott published by the magazine. 133 The Court found that a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that the article implied that
petitioner Milkovich had perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. 134
Second, the Court determined the verifiability of the defamatory
implication. The Court decided that it was indeed verifiable,
reasoning:
A determination of whether petitioner lied in this instance can be made on a core of
objective evidence by comparing, inter alia, petitioner's testimony before the
OHSAA board with his subsequent testimony before the trial court. . . . "Whether
or not [petitioner] did indeed perjure himself is certainly verifiable ...with
evidence adduced from the transcripts and witnesses present at the hearing.
Unlike a subjective assertion, the averred defamatory language is an articulation
of an objectively verifiable event."
135
The Court reversed and remanded the case, declaring that its decision
struck an appropriate balance between the rights and guarantees of
the First Amendment and the social values protected by the law of
defamation.136
III. MALEVOLENT SOFTWARE
Malevolent software is a term for computer code that is
designed to disrupt the operation of a computer system. The most
common of these rogue programs are the computer virus and its
common variant, the "worm."'137 Other forms of malicious software
include so-called "logic bombs,"138 "Trojan horses,"'139 and "trap
doors."140
133. Id. at 21-22.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio 1986)).
136. Id. at 22-23.
137. ED SKOUDIS & LENNY ZELTSER, MALWARE: FIGHTING MALICIOUS CODE 13-15
(2004).
138. A logic bomb is "[a] section of code, preprogrammed into a larger program, that
waits for some trigger event to perform some damaging function. Logic bombs do not
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A computer virus can be described as a series of instructions (a
program) that: (1) infects a host program by attaching itself to the
host; (2) executes when the host is executed; and (3) spreads by
cloning itself, or part of itself, and attaching the clones to other host
programs. In addition, many viruses have a so-called "payload,"
capable of harmful side effects, such as deleting, stealing, or modifying
digital information. 141 As the definition suggests, a typical computer
virus consists of three basic modules or mechanisms, namely an
infection module, payload trigger, and payload.
A. Infection Module
The infection module enables a virus to reproduce and attach
copies of itself onto target hosts. This mechanism is the most salient
technical property of a computer virus. 142  The first task of the
infection mechanism is to locate a prospective host program. Once a
suitable host is found, the virus may take precautions, such as
checking whether the host has already been infected. 143 The virus
then installs a copy of itself on the host. 144 Once settled, the virus may
reproduce and so are not viral, but a virus may contain a logic bomb as a payload." DAVID
HARLEY ET AL., VIRUSES REVEALED: UNDERSTAND AND COUNTER MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
654 (2001); see also PETER SZOR, THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE 30
(2005).
139. A Trojan horse is a program that appears to be beneficial, but contains a
harmful payload. SZOR, supra note 138, at 31.
140. A trapdoor, or backdoor, is a function built into a program or system to allow
unauthorized access to the system. Id. at 32; see DENNING & DENNING, supra note 3, at 75-
78.
141. SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 27. In his PhD dissertation, Dr. Cohen
defined a virus simply as any program capable of self-reproduction. See COHEN, supra note
3, at 1-2. This definition appears overly general. A literal interpretation of the definition
would classify even programs such as compilers and editors as viral. See DENNING &
DENNING, supra note 3, at 75.
142. ROGUE PROGRAMS: VIRUSES, WORMS, AND TROJAN HORSES 247 (Lance J.
Hoffman ed., 1990) ("The ability to propagate is essential to a virus program."); DENNING &
DENNING, supra note 3, at 73-75; HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 87 ([T]he infection
mechanism ... is the code that allows the virus to reproduce [and infect a target host], and
thus to be a virus. (second emphasis added)).
143. Viruses known as sparse infectors may try to slow down the rate of infection to
avoid detection, while fast infectors, on the other hand, may attempt to infect as many
hosts as possible. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 87.
144. There are three mechanisms through which a virus can infect a host program.
A virus may attach itself to its host as a shell, as an add-on, or as intrusive code. A shell
virus forms a layer ("shell") around the host code, so that the latter effectively becomes an
internal subroutine of the virus. The host program is then replaced by a functionally
equivalent program that includes the virus. The virus executes first, and then allows the
host code to execute. Boot program viruses are typically shell viruses. Most viruses are of
the add-on variety. They become part of the host by appending, or prepending, their code to
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take steps to protect itself from detection by changing its form.
145
When the host program runs,146 control is passed to the resident virus
code, allowing it to execute. The executing virus repeats the infection
cycle by automatically replicating itself and copying the newly created
clones to other executable files on the system or network, and even
across networks.
147
A virus may infect a computer or a network through several
possible points of entry, including an infected file downloaded from the
Internet, a web browser, removable media such as writable compact
discs and DVDs, infected files in shared directories, an infected e-mail
attachment, or infected commercial shrinkwrapped software. Fast-
spreading worms, such as "CodeRed" and "Blaster," infect new hosts
by exploiting network security vulnerabilities. 148  Early viruses
targeted the boot sectors of floppy disks, a trend that continued into
the 1990s. 149 Now, viruses are increasingly transmitted through e-
mail attachments.
150
E-mail is the most widely used medium of exchanging files and
sharing information, but has also become a convenient and efficient
vehicle for virus and worm propagation. For instance, fast-spreading
viruses, such as "ExploreZip" and "Melissa," exploited automatic
mailing programs to spread within and across networks. 1
51
the host code, without altering the host code. The viral code may alter the order of
execution, allowing itself to execute first and then the host code. Macro viruses- are
typically add-on viruses. Intrusive viruses, in contrast, overwrite some or all of the host
code, replacing it with its own code. See DENNING & DENNING, supra note 3, at 81; PHILIP
FITES ET AL., THE COMPUTER VIRUS CRISIS 73-75 (2d ed. 1992).
145. The capability to change its form is know as polymorphism. To detect
polymorphic viruses requires a more complex algorithm than simple pattern matching. See
DENNING & DENNING, supra note 3, at 89; see also HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 87-88.
146. The execution of a host may be triggered by human intervention, such as when
a user double-clicks on an infected e-mail attachment. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note
137, at 26-27.
147. Id. at 31-37.
148. See SZOR, supra note 138, at 365-421.
149. In 1996, for instance, approximately 9 percent of respondents to a national
survey listed e-mail attachments as the means of infection of their most recent virus
incident, while 71 percent put the blame on infected diskettes. See Larry Bridwell, ICSA
Labs 10th Annual Computer Virus Prevalence Survey, at 15 tbl. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.icsalabs.com/icsa/docs/htmlllibrary/whitepapersfVPS2004.pdf.
150. In 2004, the corresponding numbers were 92 percent for e-mail attachments
and 0 percent for diskettes. Id.
151. See Andy Bisset & Geraldine Shipton, Some Human Dimensions of Computer
Virus Creation and Infection, 52 INT'L J. HUM. COMPUTER STUD. 899, 902 (2000) (citing
Richard Ford, No Surprises in Melissa Land, 18 COMPUTERS & SEcURITY 300, 302 (1999)).
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B. Payload
In addition to replicating and spreading, viruses are often
programmed to perform specific harmful actions. The module that
implements this functionality is known as the payload. 152 A payload
can be programmed to perform destructive operations, such as
corrupting, deleting, and stealing information. 153 A payload may also
create a backdoor that allows unauthorized access to the infected
machine. 154 Some payload effects are immediately obvious, such as a
system crash, while others are subtle, such as transposition of
numbers and alteration of decimal places. 55 Subtle effects tend to be
dangerous because their presence may not be detected until
substantial harm has been done. Payloads are often relatively
harmless and do no more than entertain the user with a humorous
message, musical tune, or graphical display. 156
A payload is triggered when a specific condition is satisfied.
Triggering conditions come in a variety of forms, such as a specified
number of infections, a certain date, or specific time. For instance, the
"Friday-the-13th" virus only activated its payload on dates with the
cursed designation. 157  In the simplest case, a payload executes
whenever the virus executes, without waiting for a trigger event.
Viruses do not always have a payload module, but even viruses
152. JAN HRUSKA, COMPUTER VIRUSES AND ANTI-VIRUS WARFARE 17-18 (1990)
(noting that in addition to self-replicating code, viruses often also contain a payload, which
is capable of producing malicious side-effects); see also COHEN, supra note 3, at 8-15
(providing examples of malignant viruses and what they do); JOHN MCAFEE & COLIN
HAYNES, COMPUTER VIRUSES, WORMS, DATA DIDDLERS, KILLER PROGRAMS AND OTHER
THREATS TO YOUR SYSTEM: WHAT THEY ARE, How THEY WORK, AND HOW TO DEFEND
YOUR PC, MAC, OR MAINFRAME 60-61 (1989) (discussing the types of disruptions viruses
may cause).
153. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 97-98.
154. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 88-89; SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137,
at 27; Meiring de Villiers, Computer Viruses and Civil Liability: A Conceptual Framework,
40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 123, 172 (2004) (discussing damage due to virus infection).
155. See MCAFEE & HAYNES, supra note 152, at 61; see also SZOR, supra note 138, at
302 (describing "data diddlers" as "viruses that do not destroy data all of a sudden in a very
evident form... [but] slowly manipulate the data, such as the content of the hard disk").
156. See, e.g., Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical
Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crimes Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 218 (2000) (describing the W95.LoveSong.998 virus,
designed to trigger a love song on a particular date).
157. See id. at 217 n.176. More recently, the first CodeRed worm alternated between
continuing its infection cycle, remaining dormant, and attacking the official White House
Web page, depending on the day of the month. See Meiring de Villiers, Free Radicals in
Cyberspace: Complex Liability Issues in Information Warfare, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 13, 13 (2005).
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without a payload may harm their environment by consuming
valuable computing resources.
158
A "worm" is a special type of virus. It is similar to a virus in
most respects, except that it does not need to attach itself to a host
program to replicate and spread. Like viruses, worms often carry
destructive payloads, but even without a destructive payload a fast-
spreading worm can do significant harm by slowing down a system
through the network traffic it generates.
159
IV. THE ANATOMY OF A VIRUS ALERT
Courts resolve the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement by
considering factors such as the context of the statement and the
information on which it was based.1 6° In the case of a virus alert,
context and information depend on the technology involved. A virus
alert is generated by a computer program and is based on an
assessment of digital patterns in other programs. The truth or falsity
of an alert depends on the properties of these technologies that
generated the alert. This Part discusses the most commonly used
anti-virus technologies and the mechanisms by which they generate
virus alerts.
Technical anti-virus defenses come in four varieties: (1)
signature scanners, (2) activity monitors, (3) integrity checkers, and
158. Viruses can cause economic losses by replicating and spreading, such as filling
up available memory space, slowing down the execution of important programs, and
locking keyboards. The Melissa virus, for instance, mailed copies of itself to everyone in the
victim's e-mail address book, resulting in clogged e-mail servers and even system crashes.
See, e.g., FITES ET AL., supra note 144, at 23 (noting that the Christmas card virus stopped
a major international mail system just by filling up all available storage capacity); HARLEY
ET AL., supra note 138, at 88 ("[A] virus does not necessarily need to have either a trigger or
a payload. A virus with a trigger and payload but no replication mechanism is not, in fact,
a virus, but may well be described as a Trojan.").
159. See generally Schoch & Hupp, supra note 3, at 172 (discussing the benefits and
deleterious effects worms may have on a computer system or network).
160. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1990) (stating that it
can be objectively verified whether an individual had perjured himself, by looking at
evidence of contradictions in his testimony, trial transcripts, and the testimony of other
witnesses); Boule v. Hutton, 138 F. Supp. 2d 491, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ('"[C]hallenged
statements are not to be read in isolation, but must be perused as the average reader
would against the whole apparent scope and intent of the writing."' (quoting Celle v.
Filipino Reporter Enters., Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000))); see also Celle, 209 F.3d at
177 ("[T]he words are to be construed not with the close precision expected from lawyers
and judges but as they would be read and understood by the public to which they are
addressed."' (quoting November v. Time Inc., 194 N.E.2d 126, 128 (N.Y. 1963))); Armstrong
v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 825, 829 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that courts "must give
the disputed language a fair reading in the context of the publication as a whole" (citation
omitted)).
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(4) heuristic techniques.' 61  Scanners detect known viruses by
identifying patterns that are unique to each virus strain.162 Activity
monitors look out for virus-like activity in a computer. 163 Integrity
checkers sound an alarm when detecting suspicious modifications to
computer files. 164  Heuristic techniques combine virus-specific
scanning 65 with generic detection, 166 providing a significantly
broadened range of virus detection.
A. Scanners
Scanners are the most widely used anti-virus defense. 167 A
scanner reads executable programs and searches for the presence of
virus patterns, known as "signatures."1 68 A virus signature consists of
patterns of hexadecimal digits embedded in the viral code that are
unique to a particular virus strain. 69 These signatures are created by
human experts, at institutions such as IBM's High Integrity
Computing Laboratory, who scrutinize viral code and extract sections
of code with unusual patterns. 70 The selected byte patterns are
collected in a signature database and used in anti-virus scanners. 17' A
scanner detects a virus in a program by comparing the program to its
database of signatures and announcing a match as a possible virus. 172
An ideal virus signature would give neither false negatives nor
false positives. In other words, it would always identify the virus
161. See DENNING & DENNING, supra note 3, at 90-93; KEN DUNHAM, BIGELOW'S
VIRUS TROUBLESHOOTING POCKET REFERENCE 78-83, 102-08 (2000); HARLEY ET AL., supra
note 138, at 139-70; SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 51-64; SZOR, supra note 138,
at 425-93.
162. See SZOR, supra note 138, at 426.
163. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 151.
164. Id. at 155.
165. Virus-specific technology, such as signature scanners, detect known viruses by
indentifying patterns that are unique to each virus strain; it identifies the specific strain it
has detected. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 151-52.
166. Generic anti-virus technology detects the presence of a virus by recognizing
generic virus-like behavior, usually without identifying the particular strain. Id. Integrity
checkers and activity monitors are generic detectors. Id.
167. Id. at 158 ("Scanners, particularly signature scanners, are currently the most
popular of antiviral software.").
168. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 53-55.
169. HRUSKA, supra note 152, at 42.
170. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 53-54 ("The antivirus vendors
collect virus specimens and 'fingerprint' them.").
171. Jeffrey 0. Kephart & William C. Arnold, Automatic Extraction of Computer
Virus Signatures, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH VIRUS BULLETIN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE 178 (R. Ford ed., 1994), available at http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/
SciPapers/Kephart/VB94/vb94.html.
172. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 53-55.
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when it is present and never trigger an alarm when it is not.173
Although this ideal is unachievable in practice, anti-virus researchers
pursue optimal solutions within practical constraints. For instance,
the IBM High Integrity Computing Laboratory has developed an
optimal statistical signature extraction technique that examines all
sections of code in a virus and selects the byte strings that optimize
the tradeoff between false positives and false negatives. 17
4
Scanners are easy to use, but they are limited to detecting
known signatures. 175  A scanner's signature database has to be
updated continually as new viruses are discovered and their
signatures catalogued, a burdensome requirement in an environment
where new viruses appear daily. Modern anti-virus vendors have
attempted to lighten the burden on users by distributing signature
updates directly to their customers via the Internet.176
False negatives are rare when scanning for viruses with known
signatures, but false positives may arise when a signature has been
chosen imprudently. 177 For instance, a scan string selected as a
signature for a given virus strain may also be present in benign
objects.178 This pattern may then match code that is actually a
harmless component of a legitimate program. Furthermore, a short
and simple pattern can be found too often in innocent software and
produce many false positives. Viruses with longer and more complex
patterns, on the other hand, will give fewer false positives, but at the
expense of more false negatives.179 As the number of known viruses
grows, the scanning process will inevitably slow down as a larger set
of possibilities has to be evaluated. 80
173. HRUSKA, supra note 152, at 42. For short descriptions and hexadecimal
patterns of selected known viruses, see id. at 43-52. See also Kephart et al., supra note 5, at
11 ("[T]he signature extractor must select a virus signature carefully to avoid both false
negatives and false positives. That is, the signature must be found in every instance of the
virus, and must almost never occur in uninfected programs.").
174. Kephart & Arnold, supra note 171, at 178-84.
175. SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 53-54.
176. Id. at 54-55.
177. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 77-78.
178. Id. at 576; ROBERT SLADE, ROBERT SLADE'S GUIDE TO COMPUTER VIRUSES:
HOW TO AVOID THEM, HOW TO GET RID OF THEM, AND HOW TO GET HELP 215 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting that false positives are comparatively rare in virus scanners, but can occur if the
digital signature for a given virus is not well chosen).
179. DUNHAM, supra note 161, at 78-83; Jeffrey 0. Kephart et al., Fighting Computer
Viruses, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1997), available at http://vx.netlux.org/lib/ajk0l.html; see also
Sandeep Kumar & Eugene H. Spafford, A Generic Virus Scanner in C++, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 8TH COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE 6-8 (1992), available at
http://vx.netlux.orgflib/aes04.html.
180. See, e.g., Pete Lindstrom, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF VIRUS PROTECTION 5 (June
2003) available at http://cnscenter.future.co.kr/resource/rsc-center/vendor-wp/sopho/
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B. Activity Monitors
Activity monitors are resident programs that monitor activities
in a computer for behavior commonly associated with viruses.' 8 '
Suspicious activities include operations such as attempts by a
program to delete information and mass mail copies of itself. When
suspicious activity is detected, the monitor may simply halt execution
and alert the user, or take definite action to neutralize the activity.'8 2
Activity monitors, unlike scanners, do not need to know the signature
of a virus to detect it. Their function is to recognize general suspicious
behavior, not the precise identity of the culprit.
The greatest strength of activity monitors is their ability to
detect unknown virus strains, but they also have significant
weaknesses. They can only detect viruses that are actually executing,
possibly after substantial harm has been done. Furthermore, a virus
may execute before the monitor code does, and do harm before the
monitor is able to activate and detect it.183 Additionally, a virus may
be programmed to alter monitor code on machines that do not have
protection against such modification.1 8 4
A further weakness of activity monitors is the lack of
unambiguous rules defining "suspicious" activity.186 This may result
in false alarms when an activity monitor picks up legitimate activities
that resemble virus-like behavior.186 Recurrent false alarms may
ultimately lead users to ignore warnings from the monitor. False
negatives may result when an activity monitor fails to recognize viral
activity that does not fit the monitor's programmed definitions.'8 7
C. Integrity Verification
An integrity verifier applies the electronic equivalent of a
tamper-proof seal to protected programs and issues an alert when the
spire.pdf ("In this day of 80,000+ known viruses and frequent discovery of new ones, the
size of the signature file can be large, particularly if the updates are sent out as cumulative
ones. Large updates can clog the network pipelines ... and reduce the frequency that an
administrator will push them out to the end users.").
181. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 151.
182. Kumar & Spafford, supra note 179, at 3-4.
183. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 153-58.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Using one program to delete another, formatting a floppy disk, and boot sector
changes resulting from upgrading the operating system are all 'legitimate" operations that
may trigger false alarms. See SLADE, supra note 178, at 40-41.
187. See HRUSKA, supra note 152, at 75.
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seal has been broken, presumably by the intrusion of a virus. An
integrity verification program generates a code, known as a
"checksum," for protected files.188 A checksum may, for instance, be an
arithmetic calculation based on the total number of bytes in a file, the
numerical value of the file size, and its creation date.18 9 A checksum
is periodically recomputed and compared to the original. 190 When a
virus infects a file, it usually modifies the contents, resulting in a
change in the checksum. 191 When the recomputed value does not
match the original, the file is presumed to have been modified since
the previous inspection and a warning is issued.192
The advantage of integrity checking is that it detects most
instances of viral infection, as infection usually alters the target file.
Its main drawback is that it tends to generate false alarms, as a file
can change for "legitimate" reasons unrelated to virus infection.
1 93
Therefore, integrity checking software presents a high likelihood of a
false positive, given the general difficulty of determining whether a
program change is legitimate or due to a virus.1 94 Integrity checking
works best on static files, such as system utilities, but is an
inappropriate technique for files that change frequently, such as Word
documents.
Intelligent analysis of file changes may reduce the incidence of
false positives. A sophisticated integrity checker may, for instance,
take into account the nature and location of a file change in
determining whether it is viral.1 95 Most integrity checkers include the
option to exclude certain files or directories from monitoring.196
188. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 155-58.
189. ROBERT SLADE, DICTIONARY OF INFORMATION SEcURITY 34 (2006).
190. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 155-58.
191. DUNHAM, supra note 161, at 79; FITES ET AL., supra note 144, at 69-76, figs. 5.2-
.5; see Kumar & Spafford, supra note 179, at 5-6.
192. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 58. Integrity verification
procedures can be used in antivirus software to detect viral infection. Id. If a file has been
inexplicably modified, then the file may be infected, and the antivirus program should take
a closer look at it. Id.
193. See FITES ET AL., supra note 144, at 125; SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137,
at 58.
194. SLADE, supra note 178, at 157.
195. A Microsoft Word document can, for instance, be expected to change when a
user edits it, but modification in the case of a macro is much more suspicious.
196. SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 54 ('The user can specify that all files
should be scanned for [malevolent] code . . . . As a more efficient but less thorough




A fourth category of virus detectors uses heuristic detection
methods. Heuristic rules solve complex problems "fairly well" and
"fairly quickly," but are less than perfect. 197 Virus detection is an
example of a complex problem that is amenable to heuristic solution.
It has been proven mathematically that it is impossible to write a
virus detection program that is capable of consistent perfect
detection. 198 Heuristic virus detection methods accept such limitations
and attempt to achieve a heuristic solution, namely a detection rate
that is below the (unachievable) perfect rate but that represents an
optimal tradeoff between detection accuracy, speed, and
computational expense. 99
Heuristics detect novel viruses by examining the structure and
logic of executable code for evidence of virus-like behavior. Based on
this examination, the program assesses the likelihood that the
scrutinized program constitutes a virus by tallying up a score. The
heuristic scanner examines a file, assigns a weight to each virus-like
feature it encounters, and calculates a score based on the weights. If a
score exceeds a certain threshold, the scanner classifies the program
as malicious code and notifies the user. For instance, instructions to
send an e-mail message with an attachment to every listing in an
address book would add significantly to the score. Other high-scoring
routines include capabilities to replicate, to hide from detection, and to
execute some kind of payload. 200
A heuristic assessment is necessarily less than perfect and will
inevitably provide false positives and false negatives. A low scanner
threshold will result in false alarms. A scanner with a threshold that
is set too high, on the other hand, will fail to detect viruses that are
malicious but that do not exactly match the unrealistically tight
specifications, resulting in false negatives. 201 As in the case of activity
197. Francisco Fernandez, Heuristic Engines, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTL.
VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE 407-11 (2001).
198. Diomidis Spinellis, Reliable Identification of Bounded-Length Viruses is NP-
Complete, 49 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 280, 282 (2003) (stating that
theoretically perfect detection is in the general case undecidable, and for known viruses,
NP-complete); Carey Nachenberg, Future Imperfect, VIRUS BULL., Aug. 1997, at 6; see also
Fernandez, supra note 197, at 407-44; David M. Chess & Steve R. White, An Undetectable
Computer Virus, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, available at
http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapersVB200ODC.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2007).
199. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 159; SZOR, supra note 138, at 467.
200. See SZOR, supra note 138, at 472-74.
201. SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 56.
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monitors, the term "suspicious" is ambiguous. Many legitimate
programs, including even some anti-virus programs, perform
operations that resemble virus-like behavior.20 2 Nevertheless, state-
of-the-art heuristic scanners achieve a 70 to 80 percent success rate in
detecting unknown viruses.
203
A heuristic scanner typically operates in two phases. The
scanning algorithm first narrows the search by identifying the location
most likely to contain a virus. It then analyzes the code from that
location to determine its likely behavior upon execution. A static
heuristic scanner compares the code from the "most likely" location to
a database of byte sequences commonly associated with virus-like
behavior. The algorithm then decides whether to classify the code as
viral. 2
04
A dynamic heuristic scanner uses central processing unit
(CPU) emulation. 20 5 It loads suspect code into a virtual computer,
emulates its execution, and monitors its behavior. Because it is only a
virtual computer, virus-like behavior can be safely observed in what is
essentially a laboratory setting, with no need to be concerned about
real damage. 20 6 Although dynamic heuristics can be time-consuming
due to the relatively slow CPU emulation process, they are sometimes
superior to static heuristics. This will be the case when the suspect
code is obscure and not easily recognizable as viral in its static state,
but clearly reveals its viral nature in a dynamic state.
A major advantage of heuristic scanning is its ability to detect
viruses before they execute and cause harm. Other generic anti-virus
technologies, such as behavior monitoring and integrity checking, can
only detect and eliminate a virus based on suspicious behavior,
usually after execution. 20 7 Heuristic scanning is capable of detecting
novel virus strains whose signatures have not yet been catalogued.
Conventional scanners cannot detect such strains. Heuristic scanners
are also capable of detecting polymorphic viruses, a complex virus
202. Fernandez, supra note 197, at 409 ('Many genuine programs use sequences of
instructions that resemble those used by viruses. Programs that use low-level disk access
methods, TSRs, encryption utilities, and even anti-virus packages can all, at times, carry
out tasks that are performed by viruses.").
203. Nachenberg, supra note 198, at 7.
204. Kumar & Spafford, supra note 179, at 4-5 (discussion in "Detection by static
analysis/policy adherence").
205. The CPU of a computer is responsible for data processing and computation. See
1 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 2.02, at 2-7 (1978 & Supp. 2007); see also HRUSKA,
supra note 152, at 113 ("The CPU ... is the 'heart' of every computer. It is the device which
takes instructions from memory and executes them.").
206. Kumar & Spafford, supra note 179, at 4.
207. See, e.g., SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 58 ("The main limitation of
the integrity verification method is that it detects the infection only after it occurs.").
OPINIONATED SOFTWARE
family that complicates detection by changing its signature from
infection to infection.
208
The explosive growth in new virus strains has made reliable
detection and identification of individual strains very difficult and
costly, making heuristics more important and increasingly
prevalent.20 9 Commercial heuristic scanners include IBM's AntiVirus
boot scanner and Symantec's Bloodhound technology.210
V. TRUTH, FALSITY, AND VERIFIABILITY OF A VIRUS ALERT
The United States Supreme Court revolutionized its First
Amendment defamation jurisprudence with decisions in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,211 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,212 Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,21 3 and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 21 4
These decisions raise two implications, namely that (1) the plaintiff
must plead a defamatory statement of fact that is objectively verifiable
as true or false; and (2) the plaintiff must prove the falsity of the
defamatory statement with convincing clarity, while the defendant
may prove the truthfulness of the statement as a defense. The main
issues arising from these implications concern the truth, falsity, and
verifiability of the alleged defamatory statement.
A. Truth and Falsity
A defamation plaintiff must plead and prove the falsity of the
statement at issue. Absolute truth is a complete defense to a
defamation charge,21 5 but a defendant does not have to prove the
208. Polymorphic viruses have the ability to "mutate" by varying the code sequences
written to target files. To detect such viruses requires a more complex algorithm than
simple pattern matching. See DENNING & DENNING, supra note 3, at 89.
209. Nachenberg, supra note 198, at 9.
210. See Gerald Tesauro et al., Neural Networks for Computer Virus Recognition,
IEEE Expert, Aug. 1996, at 1, 5-6; Symantec Security Update, Bloodhound.Packed,
http://www.symantec.com/security-response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-012015-2255-99 (last
visited January 10, 2008).
211. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
212. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
213. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
214. 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
215. 1 SACK, supra note 24, § 3.3.2.1 ("The Supreme Court has not decided whether
the Constitution permits liability for truthful speech that fails the 'public concern' test, is
not contained in the media, or both. But open or not, the question is largely academic. Even
if courts may impose such liability, in practice they do not."); 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, §
5:10 ("The better view, however, is that the first amendment's protection of truth, like its
protection of opinion, stands on its own footing, and is analytically distinct from fault rules.
... Just as under the first amendment there is 'no such thing' as a false idea, there should
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literal truth of the defamatory statement to prevail. An effective
defense can rely on the "substantial truth" doctrine. 216 This doctrine
states that "'[t]ruth' will protect the defendant from liability even if
the precise literal truth of the defamatory statement cannot be
established."21 7  Minor inaccuracies are immaterial as long as the
"gist" or "sting" of the statement is true, regardless of who has the
burden of proof and what standard of proof applies.218 Then-Judge
Antonin Scalia, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit court,
provided the following illustrative example in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v.
Anderson: suppose a newspaper reports that a person has committed
thirty-five burglaries, while he has actually committed only thirty-
four.219 Although the statement is factually incorrect, it would not be
actionable. It is substantially true, because its gist can be justified,
namely that the person is a habitual burglar.
220
The Supreme Court later formulated the substantial truth test
as whether the libel as published "would have [had] a different effect
on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would
have produced."221  Falsehoods that do not harm the plaintiffs
reputation more than the full and accurate truth are, therefore, not
actionable. For instance, in Justice Scalia's illustration, it would
be 'no such thing' as liability for defamation for speaking the truth."); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783-84 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing there is no constitutional basis for a distinction between press and
non-press in defamation cases); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978)
(Burger, J., concurring) (discussing the press/non-press distinction). Lower courts routinely
follow Hepps in non-media cases. See Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d
543 (5th Cir. 1994).
216. Vachet v. Cent. Newspapers, Inc., 816 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1987); Zerangue
v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Truth is a defense to libel..
• . A publication is also protected if it is 'substantially true,' i.e., if it varies from the truth
only in insignificant details or if its 'gist' or 'sting' is true." (citations omitted)); Guccione v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[S]ubstantial truth' suffices to
defeat a charge of libel.").
217. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:14.
218. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991) ("The
common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, regardless of the form
of the communication. It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial
truth." (internal citations omitted)).
219. 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
220. Subsequent courts have adopted Judge Scalia's example in applying the
substantial truth doctrine. See Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
221. Masson, 501 U.S. at 517 (citations omitted); see also Gomba v. McLaughlin, 504
P.2d 337, 339 (Colo. 1972) ('The question, a factual one, is whether there is a substantial
difference between the allegedly libelous statement and the truth; or stated differently,
whether the statement produces a different effect upon the reader than that which would
be produced by the literal truth of the matter."). A statement is not substantially true if the
sting of the statement is worse than the exact truth. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:24.
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make no difference to a listener whether a habitual burglar had
committed thirty-four or thirty-five burglaries.
A plaintiff has considerable control over the focus of a court's
substantial truth analysis. Under common law pleading rules, a
plaintiff must allege the defamatory meaning of the defendant's
statement, namely the aspect of the statement that harmed his
reputation. 222  If the court determines that the statement is not
capable of bearing the meaning asserted by the plaintiff, it will
dismiss the complaint. 223 If, on the other hand, the court determines
that the interpretation is reasonable, it will hand the issue to the
jury.224 The jury then determines whether the defamatory meaning of
the statement was so understood by the recipient, either correctly or
mistakenly, but reasonably. 225 If the defendant's language was vague,
the jury must determine whether the claimed meaning was in fact the
recipient's interpretation.226 The jury must then decide the truth or
falsity of the defamatory meaning. 227
Golden Bear Distributing Systems of Texas, Inc. v. Chase Revel,
Inc. illustrates adjudication of the substantial truth issue. 228 In the
case, a magazine printed an article on the activities of separate
companies, all of them operating in different states under the name
"Golden Bear Distributing Systems."229 The article reported a lawsuit
for investment fraud brought against Golden Bear of California and
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 cmt. f (1977).
223. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 49, at 865.
224. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 116, at 782-83 ("[I1t remains a question for the
court whether the meaning claimed might reasonably be conveyed, and for the jury
whether it was so understood." (footnotes omitted)).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563.
226. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 116, at 781 ("If the language used is open to two
meanings, as in the case of the French word 'cocotte,' which... signifies either a prostitute
or a poached egg, it is for the jury to determine whether the defamatory sense was the one
conveyed." (footnote omitted)).
227. Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 617(b) ("Subject to the control of the court whenever
the issue arises, the jury determines whether ... (b) the matter was true or false ...."); see
also Thomas Gibbons, Defamation Reconsidered, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 587, 606
(1996) ("The jury must decide by looking to the 'gist' or the 'sting' of the allegation, asking
whether the discrepancy between the facts required to be justified and those proved to be
true would make any difference to the judgment of reasonable people."); Lisa K. Snow,
Note, A Broader Approach to the Substantial Truth Defense, 29 B.C. L. REV. 769, 785
(1988) ("The jury is the appropriate factfinder in this situation because the jury represents
the average reader or listener. The jury is in the best position to determine whether the
opprobrium attached to the alleged misstatement is similar to the opprobrium attached to
the act actually committed.").
228. 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983).
229. Id. at 946.
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described legal difficulties plaguing Golden Bear of Utah.230 The
article also referred to the marketing strategy of Golden Bear of
Texas, noting its similarity to strategies of the troubled Golden Bear
franchises. 231 The article did not state that the Texas franchise was
guilty, or even accused, of any wrongdoing. 232 However, when the
article appeared, Golden Bear of Texas rapidly lost business and was
forced into bankruptcy. 233 Golden Bear of Texas successfully sued the
magazine for libel and was awarded damages at trial.234  The
judgment was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on appeal. 235
The Fifth Circuit observed that all of the individual statements
in the magazine article concerning Golden Bear of California's legal
problems and the reference to the marketing strategy of Golden Bear
of Texas were literally true.236 However, the court accepted the
plaintiffs pleading that the magazine article falsely implied that
Golden Bear of Texas had engaged in misconduct. 237 While the
defendant argued that its article was substantially true, the court did
not agree. 238 The factual allegations of the defendants, while literally
true, did not justify the defamatory implication, namely that Golden
Bear of Texas had engaged in misconduct similar to that of Golden
Bear of California. 239 The plaintiff succeeded in proving the falsity of
the defamatory gist of defendant's communication, while the
defendant's pleaded truth failed to justify it.240
B. Substantial Truth Analysis of a Virus Alert
The aim of this subsection is to define and analyze the legal
meaning of the concept "substantial truth of a virus alert." A virus
alert literally states that "a program is infected with a specific type of
malevolent code." 241  Its truth as a technical statement is not
230. Id. at 947.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 948.
233. Id. at 947.
234. Id. at 946.
235. Id. at 952.
236. Id. at 948. See also 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:20, for a discussion of Golden
Bear.




241. SLADE, supra note 178, at 8 (Defining an alert as "notification that an event or
incident has occurred."). The event or incident announced by anti-virus software is that a
virus has been found in the files examined. See JOSE NAZARIO, DEFENSE AND DETECTION
STRATEGIES AGAINST INTERNET WORMS 175 (2003) (A signature analysis approach to worm
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controversial. Its truth as a defamatory statement and in a
constitutional sense, however, is a legal concept that requires analysis
of the defamatory meaning of the alert. The analysis suggests that a
virus alert is substantially true if, and only if, the detected object is
capable of executing an infection module. This conclusion is based on
the following reasoning:
1. A virus alert charges the plaintiff with compromising the information security
of the computing environment where its software is implemented. Therefore, the
reputational interest at stake in a virus alert is the plaintiffs reputation for the
security of its software product.
2. The defamatory meaning of a virus alert is that aspect of the alert that
threatens the plaintiffs reputation. The reproductive capability of a virus is the
essence of its threat to information security and, indirectly, the plaintiffs
reputation. Therefore, proof of a reproductive capability is sufficient to prove the
truth of the defamatory meaning-the substantial truthfulness--of a virus alert.
3. A statement is substantially true if it is factually similar to the proven truth
and differs from the truth by no more than insubstantial details. The Supreme
Court's test of substantiality is whether an allegation "would have [had] a different
effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have
produced."242 The presence of an executable infection module in malevolent
software is material to the average computer user because such a module creates a
unique and serious type of risk to information security, a risk that malevolent code
without such a module does not possess. Therefore, proof of the truth of a virus
alert must include proof of an executable infection module. In other words, a virus
alert is substantially true only if the detected object has a reproductive capability.
4. In conclusion, the presence of an executable infection module in the detected
object is a necessary and sufficient condition for a virus alert to be substantially
true.
1. Plaintiffs Reputational Interest
A software vendor's most vital intangible asset is its reputation
for secure software, especially in the security-conscious environment
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A vendor of
software, especially software destined for the networks of the national
detection compares a list of malevolent patterns against network traffic and issues an alert
when a match is found.). Some anti-virus products identify a detected virus by name, while
others make a generic identification. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 143 ("Virus-
specific software takes the approach, 'I have identified virus X."'); id. at 144 ("Generic
detection software deduces the presence of a virus from environmental anomalies. It
doesn't identify a specific virus by name."). A virus alert therefore states that a program is
infected with a specific type of malevolent code, namely a virus or a worm. A virus alert
may in some circumstances be even more specific and identify the virus or worm by name.
242. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (citation
omitted).
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information infrastructure 243 and other sensitive applications, is
dependent on a reputation for security to survive and remain in
business. 244 The most significant threat to information security is the
proliferation of computer viruses and worms on the Internet. 245 Thus,
a vendor's reputation for secure software may be irreparably harmed
by a virus alert that indicates the presence of such malevolent code in
its software product.
Modern information security has three basic components: (1)
confidentiality, (2) integrity, and (3) availability.246 Confidentiality
refers to the prevention of unauthorized access to sensitive
information. 247 Integrity refers to the protection of digital data from
unauthorized change, such as corruption or deletion. 248 Availability
refers to procedures and safeguards ensuring that authorized users
have access to information when needed and in a convenient format. 249
A computer virus threatens all components of information security
through its capability to replicate and spread. 250 The infection module
also serves to export and multiply the effect of a payload (if the virus
has a payload). Most viruses do not have a payload, though, and a
243. The national information infrastructure is an interrelated system of computer
and communication networks that control and coordinate essential infrastructures, such as
water supplies, banking and financial services, telecommunications services, and electrical
power. It also includes computer networks that coordinate and control military
communications and logistics. The private sector plays a dominant role in the critical
information infrastructure. Most infrastructures are owned by the private sector, and the
Defense Information Systems Agency depends heavily on commercial communication
networks. See GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROJECT, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES,
CYBERCRIME .. . CYBERTERRORISM ... CYBERWARFARE ... : AVERTING AN ELECTRONIC
WATERLOO, at xiv-xv (1998).
244. See, e.g., RICK LEHTINEN ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 27 (2d ed. 2006)
("In the 2000s, particularly after the attacks of 9/11, security took on a serious tone.
Corporations and government alike became more willing to make security an integral part
of their products and their jobs."); see also id. ("The challenge of this decade will be to
consolidate what we have learned-to build computer security into our products and our
daily routines, to protect data without unnecessarily impeding our ability to access it, and
to make sure that both security products and government and industry standards grow to
meet the ever-increasing scope and challenges of technology.").
245. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 25-27.
246. See MATT BISHOP, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SECURITY 1-6 (2005); RICK
LEHTINEN ET AL., supra note 244, at 9.
247. See RICK LEHTINEN ET AL., supra note 244, at 9 ("Data is confidential if it stays
obscure to all but those authorized to use it.").
248. See id. at 11.
249. See id. at 12.
250. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 97 ("Direct damage can be considered in
terms of the classic tripartite security model (Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality).
Viruses . . . have an impact across all three areas described by this model, as well as other
areas, such as accountability.").
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payload is not essential to be classified as a virus 251 or to threaten
information security.
252
a. Viral Code Threatens the Confidentiality of Information
A virus or worm can be programmed to access and steal
confidential information on a system. 253 The "W32/Bugbear@mm"
(Bugbear) family of viruses, for instance, was designed to exploit
vulnerabilities in the Outlook e-mail program to gain access to
machines, steal confidential information using a keylogging function,
and interfere with antivirus software. 254 It also created a backdoor for
hackers to take over the machine and misappropriate passwords and
confidential financial information. 255 Some members of the Bugbear
family specifically targeted financial institutions.
25 6
Viruses and worms often use spoofed e-mail and Web sites to
deceive users into disclosing confidential information, a technique
known as "phishing.' '257 The "W32fMimail.I@mm" worm, for instance,
displayed dialogues, purportedly from the online-payment service
PayPal, requesting financial information from unwitting users. The
stolen information was then encrypted and transmitted to the
attacker.
258
251. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("[O]nly the presence of the infection mechanism is mandatory
if the program is to be defined as viral: payload and trigger are optional.").
252. This section argues that a virus is capable of threatening all aspects of
information security through its infection module alone.
253. See SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 3-4 (noting that a virus could steal
files from your machine, especially sensitive ones containing personal, financial, or other
sensitive information). Viruses also monitor user keystrokes and transmit information
about the user's computing habits, websites visited, and financial information to the
attacker. See id. at 3.
254. Virus Makes Unwelcome Return, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2965924.stm.
255. Id.
256. Id.; see also Gregg Keizer, Virus Posing as Microsoft E-Mail Spreads Fast,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 19, 2003, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle
.jhtml?articleID=15000134 (describing a fast-spreading worm which attempts to steal
confidential information from infected systems); Chariot Security Information,
http://www.chariot.net.au/viruslist.php?page=lOlO31&v=l (last visited Nov. 7, 2007)
(describing the W32.Sobig and Klez worms, which have been programmed to steal
confidential information on infected machines).
257. SLADE, supra note 189, at 142.
258. See SZOR, supra note 138, at 308-09.
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b. Malicious Code Threatens the Integrity of Information
Viral payloads can be programmed to delete, modify, or corrupt
information on infected computers. 2 9 In January 2003, a young
Welshman, Simon Vallor, was sentenced to two years imprisonment
for releasing fast-spreading viruses via e-mail that were designed to
corrupt data on the hard drives of infected computers. 260 Viruses often
corrupt information by replicating and spreading alone, without the
help of a payload. According to Peter Szor, a leading anti-virus
researcher, "[v]irus replication . . . has many side effects. This
includes the possibility of accidental data loss when the machine
crashes due to a bug in the virus code or accidental overwriting of a
part of the disk with relevant data. Virus researchers call this kind of
virus a no payload virus."
261
c. Malicious Code Threatens the Availability of Information
Fast-spreading viruses make infected systems unavailable to
legitimate users by monopolizing valuable computational resources.
262
For example, a recent denial of service attack on the Port of Houston
made crucial navigating data on the port's Web service temporarily
unavailable to shipping pilots and mooring companies, creating
substantial collision and other risks.263  The Internet worm
"W32/CodeRed" and its successors were deployed to exploit a
vulnerability in Microsoft's Internet Information Services (IIS) web
servers 264 to create a global denial of service effect on the Internet. 265
259. See Computer Virus, COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2005), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/co/computer-vir.html ("Although some viruses are merely
disruptive, others can destroy or corrupt data or cause an operating system or applications
program to malfunction.").
260. Computer Virus Author Jailed, BBC NEWS, Jan. 21, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/wales/2678773.stm.
261. See SZOR, supra note 138, at 296-97.
262. See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 94 ("Network and mail viral programs
carry, in a sense, their own payloads. The reproduction of the programs themselves uses
the resources of the hosts affected and, in the cases of both the Morris Internet and
CHRISTMA worms, went so far as to deny service by using all available computing or
communications resources."); GREG HOGLUND & GARY MCGRAw, EXPLOITING SOFTWARE:
HOW TO BREAK CODE 20 (2004) ("Worms allow an attacker to 'carpet bomb' a network in an
unbridled exploration that attempts to exploit a given vulnerability as widely as possible.
This amplifies the overall effect of an attack and achieves results that could never be
obtained by manually hacking one machine at a time."); see also SZOR, supra note 138, at
306-07 (discussing denial of service attacks).
263. See Steve Gibson, The Strange Tale of the Denial of Service Attacks Against
GRC.COM, Sept. 17, 2005, http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm.
264. The attacks occurred shortly after Microsoft had discovered the vulnerability
and issued a patch to fix it. CERT, A Very Real and Present Threat to the Internet: July 31
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The "W32/Slammer" (Slammer) worm overloaded Internet routers and
slowed down networks worldwide, making it difficult to use e-mail.
The paralyzing effect of Slammer on the Internet also caused ATM
failures and interfered with elections.266 The "Sasser" worm scanned
so aggressively for new target computers that it caused networks to
become congested and slow down. In Australia, Sasser disrupted
Railcorp trains and brought down the computer system of Westpac
Bank, a major Australian financial institution.267 In the UK, Sasser
caused flight delays and brought down the computerized mapping
systems of several coastguard stations.
268
In conclusion, the reproductive capability of a virus is the
essence of its threat to information security and, indirectly, the
plaintiffs reputation. Therefore, proof of a reproductive capability is
sufficient to prove the truth of the defamatory meaning-the
substantial truthfulness--of a virus alert.
2. Evidentiary Precision
Proof of the truthfulness of a defamatory allegation must be as
precise and specific as the allegation itself.269 An allegation that a
plaintiff embezzled money cannot be justified by proving that the
plaintiff breached a fiduciary duty, 270 and a charge that a plaintiff
committed a burglary cannot be justified by proving that the plaintiff
committed a murder.
271
The common law position seems unduly strict. A defendant
may, with apparent justification, argue that an allegation that the
plaintiff had embezzled money does not harm the plaintiffs reputation
substantially more than the exact truth, namely that the plaintiff had
Deadline for Action, July 29, 2001, http://www.cert.org/congressional-testimony/
CRannounce.html.
265. See Kevin J. Houle & George M. Weaver, Trends in Denial of Service Attack
Technology, at 19 (2001), http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/DoStrends.pdf.
266. SZOR, supra note 138, at 306.
267. Worm Brings Down Coastguard PCs, BBC NEWS, May 4, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3682803.stm.
268. Id.
269. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:19 ("When the defamatory allegation is
narrow and specific, the evidence of truth must more strictly conform to the allegation."
(footnote omitted)).
270. See, e.g., Roper v. Mabry, 551 P.2d 1381, 1395 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). "[T~he
defense to this defamation action is proof of the truth of the statements that Mr. Roper is a
'thief or 'embezzler', [sic] and not proof that he breached a fiduciary duty." Id. at 1385.
271. See, e.g., Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 522 P.2d 1102, 1112 (Idaho 1974)
(finding that proof of one criminal act does not justify a charge alleging commission of a
different crime).
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breached a fiduciary duty. However, Professor Smolla explains that
"[lthe relative strictness of the common law position on substantial
truth when specific defamatory charges are made can be justified on
the grounds that more detailed charges of misconduct often tend to
create greater reputational injury, simply because the existence of
detail tends to lend credibility to the accusation."272 A defamer who
uses specificity to strengthen the credibility of his story must pay the
price, namely be required to prove the truth with evidence as precise
as the allegation itself.
273
Courts distinguish between inaccuracies where the allegation
differs factually from the truth and inaccuracies where the allegation
is factually similar to the truth, but errs in insubstantial details. 274 A
statement would be substantially true if it is factually similar to the
proven truth and differs from the truth by no more than insubstantial
details.275  An allegation that a plaintiff embezzled money is
substantially false if, in fact, the plaintiff only breached a fiduciary
duty. Justice Scalia provided an example of a newspaper report that a
person committed thirty-five burglaries, while he actually committed
only thirty-four. 276 The report is substantially true because it differs
from the factual truth only in an insubstantial detail.
The Supreme Court has analyzed the substance of a
communication by looking at the mental impact of the communication
on the average recipient. The test is whether the allegation "would
have [had] a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which
the pleaded truth would have produced."277 This subsection analyzes
the doctrines governing substantial truth in the context of a virus
alert.
Consider a virus alert based on a type of malevolent code
without an executable infection module, such as a logic bomb. 278 At a
272. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:20.
273. The defamation defendant does not, of course, bear the burden of proof of truth,
but may choose to plead a truth defense.
274. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:20; see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1148 (2001 & Supp. 2007) ("[I]f (a) the publication states facts similar to the truth
and (b) the sting of the publication is substantially equivalent to the sting of the truth, the
truth defense should ordinarily apply.").
275. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 5:20.
276. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
277. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (citation
omitted); Chung v. Better Health Plan, No. 96 CIV 7310, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9627, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1997).
278. A logic bomb lies dormant until an event, such as a pre-programmed date or
time is reached. It then activates and executes a payload, but it cannot replicate and
spread. See SZOR, supra note 138, at 30. A logic bomb always has a payload, but unlike a
virus, it has no infection module. Id. A logic bomb has been compared to a real-world
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high level of abstraction, a virus alert based on a logic bomb makes a
factually correct statement, namely that the detected object
constitutes malevolent code. Therefore, the virus alert is factually
similar to the proven truth, but the specificity of the alert
communicates additional information. When an alert identifies an
object as a virus, it implies that the object not only constitutes
malevolent code, but that it also contains an executable infection
module. If the presence of an executable infection module in
malevolent code is material to the average computer user, the virus
alert would be substantially false if it identifies an object without such
a module as viral.
279
The harm threatened by malevolent code without a
reproductive capability, such as a logic bomb, is limited by its inability
to spread beyond the system where it was planted. A virus, on the
other hand, threatens the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information far beyond its origin. Dr. Fred Cohen provides a dramatic
illustration: "Sitting at my Unix-based computer in Hudson, Ohio, I
could launch a virus and reasonably expect it to spread through 40%
of the Unix-based computers in the world in a matter of days. That's
dramatically different from what we were dealing with before
viruses."280 Dr. Cohen's statement was published more than a decade
ago. Today, viruses spread much faster, and there is every indication
that virus transmission will continue to accelerate. The 2003 ICSA
report remarks, for instance, that, while it took the early file viruses
months to years to spread widely, subsequent macro viruses took
weeks to months, mass mailers took days, "Code Red" took
approximately 12 hours, and "Klez" spread around the world in 2.5
landmine. See TECH-FAQ, What is a Logic Bomb?, http:www.tech-faq.com/logic-
bomb.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
279. See Currier v. W. Newspaper, Inc., 855 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Ariz. 1993) ("A
technically false statement may nonetheless be considered substantially true if, viewed
'through the eyes of the average reader,' it differs from the truth 'only in insignificant
details."').
280. COHEN, supra note 3, at 25; see CLIVE GRINGRAS, THE LAWS OF THE INTERNET
58 (1997) ("A computer file harbouring [sic] a virus can, in a matter of hours, spread across
continents, damaging data and programs without reprieve."); see also FITES ET AL., supra
note 144, at 21-22 (discussing the history of computer virus programs); Bradley S. Davis,
It's Virus Season Again, Has Your Computer Been Vaccinated? A Survey of Computer Crime
Legislation as a Response to Malevolent Software, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 411, 437 n. 225 ("[A]
user whose computer was infected could connect to an international network such as the
Internet and upload a file onto the network that contained a strain of malevolent software.
If the software was not detected by a scanning system ... on the host computer, infection
could spread throughout the Internet through this simple exchange of data." (citation
omitted)).
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hours.281 Whereas code such as a logic bomb can destroy data worth
D, releasing a virus to do the same job can cause that same harm
several times over by spreading into N number of systems, causing
damage of magnitude N * D, where N can be very large. This
distinction is clearly material to computer users.
Thus, a virus alert requires proof of a reproductive capability to
be substantially true. Proof that an object is a logic bomb does not
justify calling it a virus, just as proof that a plaintiff committed a
single homicide does not justify calling him a mass murderer.
28 2
Identifying an object without a reproductive capability as a virus
materially mischaracterizes it and significantly misstates the nature,
as well as the degree, of harm of which it is capable. Furthermore, the
specificity of a virus alert, as a warning that implies a risk that could
escalate into an electronic tsunami as opposed to a localized threat,
strengthens the credibility and impact of the communication. Under
common law evidentiary standards and the Supreme Court's mental
impact test,28 3 proof of the truth of a virus alert should therefore
include proof of an executable infection module.
The analysis in this subsection has provided two major
conclusions. First, proof of a reproductive capability is sufficient to
prove the truth of the defamatory meaning-the substantial
truthfulness-of a virus alert. Second, a virus alert is true only if the
detected object contains an executable infection module. Therefore,
proof of a reproductive capability is necessary to prove the substantial
truthfulness of a virus alert.
Thus, a virus alert is substantially true if, and only if, the
detected object contains an executable infection module. Put
differently, the presence of an executable infection module is
necessary and sufficient for a virus alert to be substantially true. A
plaintiff may prove the falsity of a virus alert by demonstrating that
the detected object either does not have an infection module or that it
has an infection module that cannot execute, perhaps due to a
programming or logical error in the module's code.
281. ICSA Labs 9th Annual Computer Virus Prevalence Survey (2003),
http://www.securitymanagement.com/archive/library/ICSAVirus 0604.pdf.
282. See Barlow v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 522 P.2d 1102, 1112 (Idaho 1974) (finding
that proof that plaintiff had committed one crime does not justify a false allegation that he
had committed a different crime); KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 841 ("[A defendant] may
not avoid liability by proving that the imputation was true in part, or, if the charge is one
of persistent misconduct, by showing that it was true in a single instance." (footnotes
omitted)).
283. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991).
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C. Forensic Proof of Truth and Falsity
Courts resolve the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement by
considering factors such as the context of the statement and the
information on which it was based. 2 4 In the case of a virus alert,
context and information are creatures of technology. A virus alert is
generated by a computer program and is based on an assessment of
digital patterns in other programs. 28 5 The truth or falsity of an alert
therefore depends on the properties of the technologies that generated
the alert.
A virus alert is substantially true only if the identified code is
capable of executing an infection module. This capability can often be
conclusively verified by analyzing the code. Analysis of the logic of the
host program, the viral code, and its infection module, as well as the
absence of programming and logical errors, may reveal that the host
will be run, control will be passed to the viral code, and the infection
module will be triggered. In such a technically complex but
uncontroversial case, the virus alert would be provably true and the
defendant should prevail on a truth defense.
A more complicated situation arises when the detected virus
cannot execute on the system in which it was found, even though it
could execute on another system. Such viruses are known as "latent"
or "dormant."286  "For example, a PC-specific program infected by a
PC-specific file virus cannot normally be executed on a UNIX server or
a Macintosh."28 7  It may nevertheless be found in these "foreign"
environments, perhaps in an FTP directory288 or as part of an e-mail
attachment. The dormant virus may later "wake up" when it is
transferred to a system on which it could execute, perhaps by e-mail or
through file sharing. This kind of transmission is known as
"heterogeneous virus transmission. 28 9
284. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1990) (stating that it
can be objectively verified whether an individual had perjured himself, by looking at
evidence of contradictions in his testimony, trial transcripts, and the testimony of other
witnesses); Boule v. Hutton, 138 F. Supp. 2d 491, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that alleged
defamatory statements should not be read in isolation, but should be reviewed within
whole context of the publication as the average, reasonable, intended reader would (citing
Celle v. Filipino Rptr. Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000))).
285. See supra Part IV.
286. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 8.
287. Id. at 9.
288. An FTP, or File Transfer Protocol, is a program that connects two computers so
that files can be transferred between them.
289. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 144.
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The truth or falsity of a virus alert based on a dormant virus
may be controversial. If heterogeneous transmission of the dormant
virus were possible, 290 its infection module would, in principle, be
executable and the virus alert would be substantially true. The
state-transfer to an environment where it can execute-can be
interpreted as a triggering condition that has to be satisfied to execute
the infection module. If this trigger can be satisfied, the alert would
be substantially true. The dormant virus cannot do harm in its
current environment, but it is nevertheless a security threat. By
analogy, a firearm may justifiably be described as "dangerous," even if
currently in possession of a responsible person, if it could easily fall
into unsafe hands.
291
A dormant virus should be distinguished from a virus that
cannot execute because of a logical or programming defect in its code.
Neither the dormant virus of the previous example, nor the defective
"virus," can execute in their current states, but both can be
transformed into a state where they can execute. The dormant virus
can be transferred to a new environment and the defective virus can
be debugged. If an alert based on the dormant virus is substantially
true, the superficial similarity of these situations may seem to suggest
that an alert based on the defective virus must also be substantially
true. However, it ignores the fact that the truth of an alert must be
evaluated with respect to the object on which the alert was based, and
as of the time when the alert was communicated. 292 In the dormant
case, the virus on which the alert was based is identical to the virus
that can execute in the new environment. Therefore, the virus alert is
correct when it identifies the dormant object as viral. In the case of
the defective virus, in contrast, the virus on which the alert was based
is not the same as the virus that could eventually execute.
Furthermore, at the time the alert was communicated, the object of
the communication was not executable and, thus, not a virus. The
executable virus is a corrected version of the defective object on which
290. A PC-specific program infected by a PC-specific file virus resident in an e-mail
attachment, on a Macintosh, for instance, may be transmitted to a PC where it could
execute.
291. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 246, at 4 ("A threat is a potential violation of
security. The violation need not actually occur for there to be a threat. The fact that the
violation might occur means that those actions that could cause it to occur must be guarded
against (or prepared for.) Those actions are called attacks. Those who execute such actions,
or cause them to be executed, are called attackers.").
292. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. g (1977) ("The truth of a
defamatory imputation of fact must be determined as of the time of the defamatory
publication.").
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the alert was based. A virus alert based on the original defective virus
would therefore be false.
False positives are comparatively rare in virus scanners, but
they may occur if a virus signature is not well chosen. For instance, a
signature that also occurs in legitimate code may cause a scanner to
misdiagnose a program as infected. 293 A type of false positive known
as a "ghost positive" is generated when remnants of a virus are
incorrectly detected and reported as viral.294 Ghost positives may
occur when an antivirus program attempts to remove a virus from an
infected file but leaves part of the virus code intact. The remnant code
may contain a virus signature, even though the disembodied remnant
cannot execute. Another anti-virus program may subsequently scan
the file, detect the remnant, and report it as viral. Ghost positives
also occur when a computer user installs two or more scanners
simultaneously on the same computer. One of the scanners may fail
to encrypt its virus signatures and store them in plain text, exactly in
the format in which they would appear in an infected file. 295 The other
scanner may then identify these signatures as a viral presence in the
computer. 296 The detected objects cannot execute because they are
inactive disembodied signatures. Therefore, a virus alert based on a
ghost positive would be substantially false.
297
Generic virus detectors issue alerts when they detect viral
evidence in a program. 298 Activity monitors and heuristic detectors
monitor a network for suspicious activities, while integrity checkers
look out for unauthorized changes to files. 299  These detectors
frequently issue false alerts because their decision rules tend to be
ambiguous. A file can change for "legitimate" reasons unrelated to
293. See SLADE, supra note 178, at 215.
294. See Andreas Marx, Anti-Virus vs. Anti-Virus: False Positives in AV Software,
VIRUS BULL., Oct. 2003, at 17-18, available at http://www.av-test.org/down/papers/2003-
10_vb falsepos.pdf
295. Id.
296. This false positive problem can be avoided if producers of anti-virus scanners
properly encrypted all their virus signatures in all parts of the program being scanned, the
scanning engine, and in the virus definition files. See id. at 18.
297. Andreas Marx reports the following ghost positive incident. The anti-virus
software, AntiVir, was written to disinfect systems infected with the worm Win32/Qaz. Id.
Its disinfection routine included storing the strings "StartIE" and "qazwsx.hsq" in plain
text to delete keys created by Win32/Qaz. Id. The presence of these strings was detected by
another anti-virus product, namely Network Associates' VirusScan, which flagged AntiVir
as a possible variant of the Win32/Qaz worm. Id.; see also HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138,
at 57, 78.
298. HARLEY ET AL., supra note 138, at 153.
299. Id. at 153-58.
2008]
314 VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:2:269
virus infection, resulting in a false alert by an integrity checker.300 A
heuristic detector can set its detection threshold too low and allow
innocent code to trigger an alert. An alert generated in this way
would, likewise, be false.
In conclusion, the truth/falsity issue of a virus alert must be
resolved in the context of the technology that generated it, namely the
detection technology that issued the alert and the digital properties of
the detected object.
D. Verifiability
The previous Part discussed forensic verification of the truth of
a virus alert. In the illustrative cases, verification was determinate:
the virus alert was demonstrably either true or false. This will not
always be the case. The computational logic of malicious code and the
mathematical algorithm controlling its operation may be such that (1)
a virus detector may classify code as viral due to the presence of,
perhaps, a virus signature, yet (2) forensic analysis of the code may
show that executability of the infection module is indeterminate. As a
result, truth or falsity of the alert is also indeterminate. The following
stylized program illustrates this phenomenon and its legal
implications.
Consider a virus that has inserted its code at the end of a host
program, as shown in the illustration below. This is a so-called
"appending virus."301 After appending itself to the host, the virus code
inserts an algorithm at the beginning of the host. The purpose of the
algorithm is to transfer control to the virus when a pre-specified
mathematical condition is satisfied. Another jump routine at the end
of the viral code returns control to the host program.
When the computer attempts to execute the host, the algorithm
runs first. The algorithm generates a random even number greater
than two and tests whether it can be written as the sum of two prime
numbers. 30 2 If it cannot be written as the sum of two primes, control
is passed to the virus. The algorithm also passes the even number it
has generated to the virus code. The virus code verifies that the even
300. See FITES ET AL., supra note 144, at 125.
301. SKOUDIS & ZELTSER, supra note 137, at 36.
302. See GEORGE E. ANDREWS, NUMBER THEORY 15 (1994) ("A positive integer p
other than 1 is said to be a prime if its only positive divisors are I and p."); id. at 20 ("If a
and b (b # 0) are integers, we say b divides a, or b is a divisor of a, if a/b is an integer."). A
computational method, known as Eratosthenes' sieve method, can be used to test whether
an integer greater than two can be written as the sum of two primes. See A. Granville et
al., Checking the Goldbach Conjecture on a Vector Computer, in NUMBER THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 423, 423-33 (R.A. Mollin ed., 1989).
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number cannot be written as the sum of two primes and then
executes, replicates, and attaches copies of itself to other host files.
3 03
It also executes a payload, which deletes the host computer's hard
disk.
If, on the other hand, the algorithm is satisfied that the even
number it has generated can be written as the sum of two primes, it
does not pass control to the virus code, but removes the virus from the
host program, passes control back to the host program, and modifies
itself to directly transfer control to the host from then on. In other
words, the virus is effectively removed from the host.















303. A virus' infection mechanism may also have a trigger. See HARLEY ET AL., supra
note 138, at 7 ("[I]f the virus is at all selective about the circumstances under which it will
attempt to infect, the infection mechanism may also be said to incorporate a trigger.").
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Suppose this virus is detected before the host is invoked, the
algorithm is executed, or the virus is triggered. It is detected, perhaps
by a signature scanner-which observed the signature embedded in its
main body-or by a heuristic scanner-which recognized virus-like
behavior inherent in the code-such as evidence of an infection
module. The vendor of the allegedly infected software believes that its
quality control and business practices have been called into question
by the virus alert, and sues the vendor of the antivirus software for
defamation. The plaintiff needs to prove the falsity of the alert,
namely that the detected object cannot execute its infection module.
The defendant will prevail if she can prove the substantial truth of the
alert.
A virus alert would be substantially true if the algorithm could
generate a number capable of triggering the infection module.30 4 This
would be the case only if there exists such a number, namely an even
number greater than two that cannot be written as the sum of two
primes. Conversely, the virus alert would be false if such a number
does not exist.
The truth or falsity of the virus alert depends on a
mathematical conjecture, known as Goldbach's Conjecture.3 5 The
Goldbach Conjecture states that every even number greater than two
can be written as the sum of two primes. For example, the even
number thirty-six can be written as 17 + 19. If Goldbach is correct,
then the algorithm cannot possibly generate the kind of number that
would allow execution of the viral code and its infection module. In
this case, the gist of the virus alert would be provably false, and thus,
the falsity issue would be decided in favor of the plaintiff.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Goldbach is incorrect. This
means that there must exist at least one even number that cannot be
written as the sum of two primes. If the algorithm fortuitously
generated this number, its logic would transfer control to the virus,
which would then execute, replicate, spread, and fire its payload.
Although this number (and others that violate Goldbach, if they exist)
may not be generated by the one-time run of the algorithm, the
number(s) could, theoretically, be generated. The gist of the virus
304. See BISHOP, supra note 246, at 4 ("A threat is a potential violation of security.
The violation need not actually occur for there to be a threat. The fact that the violation
might occur means that those actions that could cause it to occur must be guarded against
(or prepared for).").
305. See ANDREWS, supra note 302, at 111. The fame of the Goldbach Conjecture has
even inspired a novel. See APOSTOLOS DOXIADIS, UNCLE PETROS AND GOLDBACH'S
CONJECTURE (2000).
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alert would be true in this case, and the defendant would have a
constitutional defense.
The truth or falsity of an alert appears to be verifiable with
mathematical precision. If Goldbach were correct, the gist of the virus
alert would be false, and if Goldbach were incorrect, the gist would be
true. However, Goldbach's Conjecture is an unresolved problem in
mathematics. No one has (at the time of this writing) proven its truth
or falsity.30 6 Therefore, the truth of the virus alert is unverifiable.
Under the constitutional standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 30 7 statements that are not
objectively verifiable, or that do not contain a provably false
connotation, are entitled to full First Amendment protection. 308 The
virus alert in this example is therefore First Amendment protected
speech, and a defamation claim based on it should be resolved in favor
of the defendant. Prior to 1964 and the constitutionalization of
defamation law, when the defendant had the burden of proving truth,
the plaintiff would have prevailed on this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the balance between two conflicting
legal rights associated with a virus alert: the rights and guarantees of
the First Amendment, and the social values protected by the law of
defamation. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the
conflict in a series of influential decisions. 30 9 The decisions raise two
implications: (1) a plaintiff must plead a defamatory statement of fact
that is objectively verifiable as true or false; and (2) a plaintiff must
prove the falsity of the defamatory statement with convincing clarity,
while the defendant may prove the truthfulness of the statement as a
defense. 310
306. See ARTURO SANGALLI, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING FUZZY AND OTHER INSIGHTS
FROM THE BORDER BETWEEN MATH AND COMPUTERS 80 (1998) ("[N]o one has yet found an
even number that is not the sum of two primes; but nor has anyone demonstrated that
such a number cannot exist, so the question is still unsettled."); see also JOHN DERBYSHIRE,
PRIME OBSESSION: BERNHARD RIEMANN AND THE GREATEST UNSOLVED PROBLEM IN
MATHEMATICS 90 (2003) ("Twenty-six decades of effort by some of the best minds on the
planet have failed to prove or disprove this simple assertion .....
307. 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
308. Id. at 20 (interpreting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986) as "ensur[ing] that a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern
which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional
protection").
309. See supra Part II.
310. See supra Parts II.A-B, V.A.
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The main issues in these implications are truth, falsity, and
verifiability. This article has argued that a virus alert is substantially
true if, and only if, the detected object has an executable infection
module. 31' A defamatory statement is substantially true if that aspect
of the statement that threatens the reputation of the plaintiff is true.
A virus alert threatens the plaintiffs reputation for secure software,
and the reproductive capability of a virus is the essence of the security
threat of a virus. Therefore, proof of such a capability is sufficient to
prove the substantial truthfulness of a virus alert.
A statement is substantially true if it is factually similar to the
proven truth and differs from the truth by no more than immaterial
details.3 12 This'article has argued that the presence of an executable
infection module in malevolent software is material to the average
computer user because such a module creates a unique and serious
type of risk to information security, a risk that malevolent code
without such a module does not have. 313 Therefore, a virus alert is
substantially true only if the detected object has a reproductive
capability. Proof of such a capability is therefore necessary to prove
the substantial truthfulness of a virus alert. Thus, proof of an
executable infection module is necessary and sufficient to establish the
substantial truthfulness of a virus alert.
The logic of these arguments is consistent with the doctrinal
requirement that proof of the truthfulness of a defamatory allegation
be as precise and specific as the allegation itself. Identifying an object
without a reproductive capability as a virus materially
mischaracterizes it and significantly misstates the nature as well as
the degree of harm it is capable of causing. Furthermore, the
specificity of a virus alert, as a warning that implies a risk that could
escalate into an electronic tsunami as opposed to a localized threat,
strengthens the credibility and impact of the communication. A
defamer that uses such specificity to strengthen the credibility of the
story must pay the price, namely being required to prove the truth
with evidence as precise as the allegation itself. Proof of the truth of a
virus alert should, therefore, include proof of an executable infection
module.
This article further contributes a forensic analysis of the
truthfulness of a virus alert based on the properties of the
technologies that generated the alert.3 14  This article merges
311. See supra Part V.B.
312. See supra Part V.A.
313. See supra notes 246, 247, 250-52 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part V.C.
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perspectives from constitutional law, the law of defamation, and
information technology. Perhaps the most striking insight of the
analysis is the role of technology in shaping the contours of the
balance between conflicting legal interests. For instance, insights
from theoretical computer science demonstrate that the truth of a
virus alert may be unverifiable. In such a case, the alert would
receive full constitutional protection under the Supreme Court's First
Amendment defamation jurisprudence.
Although this article focuses on false positives issued by virus
detectors, the analysis can be adapted to false positives in other
contexts, such as wrongful mammogram, HIV, sobriety, polygraph,
drug, or paternity tests. Similar constitutional, reputational, and
technological issues would likely play a key role in these contexts.
Plaintiffs have litigated false positives in drug tests and medical
diagnoses, claiming negligence, 31 5  defamation, 316  and emotional
distress, 317 but none of the reported defamation cases has considered
the truth, falsity, and verifiability issues analyzed in this article.
Thus, although the analysis in this article has focused on false
positives in computer and information security, it could have wide-
ranging implications for defamation jurisprudence beyond this
context.
315. See Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App 1992); Lewis v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 588 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Karen Manfield, Comment, Imposing
Liability on Drug Testing Laboratories for "False Positives" Getting Around Privity, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 287, 299-302 (1997); see also Thomas L. McGovern III, Note, Employee Drug-
Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453,
1458, n.32 (1987) (discussing settlement of negligence action against testing laboratory by
two job applicants whose applications were rejected due to false positive tests for
marijuana).
316. See Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1995); Houston
Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
317. See, e.g., R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995). The petitioner,
who was misdiagnosed as having Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), filed suit against
the medical facility, laboratory, and physician responsible for the misdiagnosis, claiming
physical and mental anguish. Id. at 362. The Florida Supreme Court recognized that a
negligent misdiagnosis that results in physical injuries (e.g. from unnecessary treatment)
may be recoverable in tort. Id. at 363. The Court held that in this particular case,
petitioner's alleged injuries were insufficient to satisfy the so-called "impact rule," which
limits recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to physical injuries. Id. at 364.
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